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THE COURTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE ORDEAL
OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
David Rudenstine*
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II and the emergence of what are
popularly termed the "Imperial Presidency"l and the "National
Security State,,,2 the Supreme Court has, in one decision after
another, shaped numerous legal doctrines that insulate the Executive
from meaningful judicial oversight in cases the Executive claims
implicate national security.3 In those decisions, the courts have
utilized a variety of legal techniques to restrict or totally prohibit
meaningful judicial review of the Executive conduct in question. 4

*

1.

2.
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David Rudenstine is the Sheldon H. Solow Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, Yeshiva University. I wish to thank Brachah Goykadosh and
Benjamin Cooper, 2014 Cardozo School of Law graduates, and Brett Bacon, Laith
Hamdan, and Adam Riff, current Cardozo students, for their very helpful assistance in
preparing this article for publication.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. gave a broad currency to the phrase the "Imperial
Presidency" in his frequently cited 1973 study entitled The Imperial Presidency.
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). For a more recent
study invoking the same phrase, see Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the

Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy (2007).
Garry Wills utilized the popular phrase in the title of a recent book, Bomb Power: The
Modern Presidency and the National Security State. GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER:
THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (2010). Dana Priest
and William M. Arkin provided a slight modification of this popular term in their
recent book, entitled Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security
State. DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, Top SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE
NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE (2011).
See generally David Rudenstine, The Irony of a Faustian Bargain: A Reconsideration
of the Supreme Court's 1953 United States v. Reynolds Decision, 34 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1283, 1287-88 & nn.13-18, 1391 & n.525 (2013) (explaining that the Supreme
Court in United States v. Reynolds was a major pillar of the Age of Deference, which
has resulted in the "insulation of the executive from meaningful judicial
accountability and review, a distortion in the checks and balances governmental
scheme, the denial of a judicial remedy to those allegedly harmed by executive branch
conduct, and the undermining of the rule oflaw").
Justice Sutherland wrote a pre-World War II opinion of unusual importance in the
development of the Age of Deference in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936).
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For example, courts have relied upon the executive privilege,S the
state secrets privilege,6 standing requirements,7 pleading rules,s the
qualified immunity doctrine,9 as well as the requirements for a
meritorious claim for relief'° to dismiss cases from the courts.
Woven together these doctrines create a protective shield surrounding
the Executive that gives rise to what I have termed the Age of
Deference. II
Serious consequences have resulted from this seventy-year era of
deference. 12 An individual arguably denied a vested right by
executive branch officials is denied judicial relief. 13 Executive
5.
6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

The foundational case for a constitutionally based executive privilege is United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953), announced the contemporary state
secrets privilege. For two recent lower court opinions substantially extending the rule
in Reynolds, see Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1081-84 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) and El-Masri v. United
States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007). The controversial
state secrets privilege seems now disfavored by the Executive and the courts, which,
as a result, have utilized other doctrines-such as no claim for relief, standing rules,
pleading rules-to dismiss a case (or party) implicating national security. See
Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1288, 1391 n.525.
See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013). On June 16,
2014, the Supreme Court distinguished Clapper in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014). In the Susan B. Anthony List case, the Court granted
standing to a party seeking to enjoin government officials from enforcing the law, on
the grounds that the law in question violated limits established by the First
Amendment. Id. Although the case did not in any way implicate national security, it
is noteworthy that the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had a sufficient injury to
satisfy the constitutional requirements for standing. Id. at 2343.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011).
See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3409 (2010).
See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1287.
Id. at 1288.
See generally Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims alleging torture and
degrading treatment by federal officials), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); Arar,
585 F.3d at 627 (Pooler, J., dissenting) ("Ultimately, the majority concludes that the
Constitution provides Arar no remedy for this wrong, that the judiciary must stay its
hand in enforcing the Constitution because untested national security concerns have
been asserted by the Executive branch."); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296,
313 (4th Cir.) ("[T]he state secrets privilege imposes a heavy burden on the party
against whom the privilege is asserted . . .. That party loses access to evidence that
he needs to prosecute his action and, if privileged state secrets are sufficiently central
to the matter, may lose his cause of action altogether."), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947
(2007);' ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 687 (6th Cir. 2007) (dismissing plaintiffs'

2014

The Courts and National Security

39

branch officials who may have committed unlawful acts that have
violated an individual's constitutional rights escape judicial
accountability for their actions. 14 The structural checks and balances
scheme central to the constitutional distribution of power is
undermined by the failure of the courts to exercise meaningful review
in national security cases. 15 Because this deference encourages
executive officials to expect that they will not be held accountable for
their conduct, this deference permits, if not encourages, executive
officials to prospectively overlook or ignore their obligation to adhere
to legal norms. 16 Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded when
the courts dismiss actions because of the alleged need for secrecy in
actions in which a plaintiff alleges egregious violations of law. 17 The
nation's fundamental ideal of preserving and strengthening the
national commitment to the rule of law is betrayed by the very
governing institution-the courts-primarily charged with preserving
More generally, because the
and strengthening the ideal. 18
constitutional order is premised not just on a doctrine of separation of
powers among the three co-equal branches of government,19 but on a

14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

claims based on standing and holding that "even to the extent that additional evidence
may exist, which might establish standing . . . discovery of such evidence would,
under the circumstances of this case, be prevented by the States Secrets Doctrine");
Halkin v. Helms (Halkin I), 598 F.2d I, 3-5 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (determining that the
states secrets privilege prevents the NSA from having to admit or deny the warrantless
acquisition of plaintiffs' international communications).
See cases cited supra note 13.
For cases in which the courts exercise meaningful judicial review in national security
cases and thus advance the important function of checks and balances, see Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004), New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 714 (1971) (per curiam), and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,585 (1952). One scholar recently summed up the checks and
balances dynamic built into the constitutional scheme as follows:
[James] Madison is generally credited as the lead architect of our
constitutional design. Animated by his vision of checks and
balances, the founders prescribed an intricate network of new
institutions, all holding the others to account through carefully
distributed powers and chosen through a variety of different
methods designed to prevent anyone faction from dominating.
PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: How EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (2009).
See SHANE, supra note 15, at 3.
See Arar, 585 F.3d at 630 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1370.
See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-58 (1983) (upholding the doctrine of
separation of powers by concluding that the congressional veto that allowed one
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complicated system of checks and balances20 that assumes that the
Executive will not be "above the law,,,21 this Age of Deference
contributes to the potential collapse of the constitutional order.
Central to the Age of Deference is the state secrets privilege,22 and
because it is so emblematic of the entire era, a study of the
contemporary state secrets privilege sheds considerable light on the
broader and highly significant theme of the judicial function in
national security cases since World War II.23 This Article assesses
the contemporary state secrets privilege. 24 In so doing, it outlines the

20.

21.
22.

23.
24.

House of Congress to override a decision by the executive branch under the
Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutional).
See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997) (describing the three branches of
government as "a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other"); see also United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) ("[D]eciding whether a matter has in any measure
been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a
delicate exercise .... ") (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211 (1962».
See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 696; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
The state secrets privilege is a common law rule of evidence that courts have enforced
to protect national security secrets. See infra Part I; see also, Rudenstine, supra note
3, at 1371-72. For a selection of recent law review articles on state secrets, see
Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009),
for a discussion of the deference granted by courts to matters of national security;
Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1249 (2007) [hereinafter Limits of National Security Litigation],
for a discussion of the origin and evolution of the state secret privilege leading up to
its use in 2007 by the Bush Administration; Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State
Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 77 (2010), for a discussion of the practical implications of
the state secrets doctrine for private and public actors in cases moving through the
courts between 2001-2009; Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and
Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1931 (2007), for a discussion of the
importance of checks and balances to limit the abuse of the state secrets privilege;
Beth George, Note, An Administrative Law Approach to Reforming the State Secrets
Privilege, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1691 (2009), for a discussion of the advantages of
administrative law to limiting or curbing the use of the state secret privilege; Carrie
Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through
Government Misuse, II LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2007), for a discussion of
changes that have happened to state secret jurisprudence since Reynolds; Christina E.
Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CaNST. COMMENT. 625, 630-31
(2010), for a discussion of the use of the state secret privilege under the Obama
Administration.
See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1391.
See Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1267 n.113 (sampling of
critical commentary of the state secrets privilege). For two highly controversial cases
discussing the states secrets privilege, see Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614
F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) and El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th CiT. 2007).
These cases generated very critical press commentary. See Editorial, Security Secrets
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privilege announced by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Reyriolds/ 5 which set forth the foundational guidelines for the
contemporary privilege;26 it maps the expansion of the robust and
sweeping contemporary privilege and relates that expansion to the
much narrower privilege announced in Reynolds/7 it assesses the
consequences of the contemporary privilege;28 it recommends
changes in the privilege and addresses the impact of those
recommended changes on national security;29 and finally, it opens a
useful window on the much broader subject of the role of courts in
cases implicating national security.30

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.

and Justice; Why New Laws are Needed to Govern Sensitive Lawsuits Against the
Government, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,2010, at AI4 ("The case [Jeppesen] again points
out the need for a new law to govern cases in which national security secrets are
involved."); Editorial, The ACLU is Dismissed, WALL ST. J., Sept. II, 2010, at AI2
("Nor will the ACLU find much solace in the Obama Administration, which has
largely preserved the antiterror legal regime established by its predecessor even as it
has tinkered with some of the language."); Editorial, Too Many Secrets, N.Y. TiMES,
Mar. 10, 2007, at AI2 ("It is a challenge to keep track of all the ways the Bush
Administration is eroding constitutional protections, but one that should get more
attention is its abuse of the state secrets doctrine."); Editorial, Too Much Privilege,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at A26 (stating that the Obama Administration's decision
to assert the state secrets privilege was "gravely disappoint[ing]" and urging the Ninth
Circuit judges to allow the Jeppesen "case [to] proceed so that these alleged victims of
U.S. mistreatment can make their case in court"); Editorial, Torture Gets a Free Pass,
Bas. GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2010, at K8 ("This standard is far too sweeping, because
there's a way to honor both the government's need for secrecy and plaintiffs' rights to
have their allegations heard."); Editorial, Torture is a Crime, Not a Secret, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at A30 ("The state secrets doctrine is so blinding and powerful
that it should be invoked only when the most grave national security matters are at
·stake .... It should not be used to defend against allegations that if true ... would be
'gross violations of the norms of international law. "'); see also Khaled EI-Masri,
Editorial, [Am Not a State Secret, L.A. TiMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at A19.
345 U.S. 1(1953).
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV. For a review and discussion of the legislative proposals to
Congress, see Jessica Slattery Karich, Restoring Balance to Checks and Balances:
Checking the Executive's Power Under the State Secrets Doctrine, Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 114 W. VA. L. REv. 759, 779 (2012). Karich entitIes a
section "Proposed Legislative Reforms to the State Secrets Doctrine." [d.; see also
Emily Berman, Executive Privilege Disputes Between Congress and the President: A
Legislative Proposal, 3 ALB. GOV'TL. REv. 741, 750 (2010).
See infra Part IV.
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In summary, this Article puts forth several claims. The Supreme
Court's 1953 Reynolds31 decision set forth a set of doctrinal rules that
still guide the application of the state secrets privilege.32 Those rules
had no antecedents in United States law 3 and thus were not a
restatement of previously announced state secrets rules. 34 Instead, the
Court in Reynolds fashioned them out of whole cloth. Moreover, the
contemporary state secrets privilege is not a necessary extraction
from Reynolds,35 nor are the rules comprising the contemporary state
secrets privilege mandated by the Constitution or statute. In other
words, the robust and sweeping rules constituting the contemporary
privilege are now as much a product of judicial discretion by
comparison to the Reynolds decision as the rules announced in
Reynolds were by comparison to earlier state secrets decisions. Thus,
just as the Reynolds rules constituted a departure from prior state
secrets cases, the contemporary state secrets rules are a departure
from Reynolds. 36 And just as Reynolds both reflected and nurtured
the Age of Deference, so do the rules of the contemporary state
secrets privilege.
Although the Supreme Court generally initiates and charts the
course of important legal doctrine,37 this was not the case in the
development of the contemporary state secrets privilege. Instead, the
circuit courts chartered the boundaries of the contemporary privilege
in a handful of decisions,38 with the Supreme Court assuming a
mainly passive role either because a party did not petition for
certiorari or the Court denied it when review was sought. 39 But now
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

345 U.S. I (1953).
See, e.g., Fazaga v. FBI, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (applying
Reynolds by dismissing plaintiffs' claims against the FBI based on the state secrets
doctrine).
See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1363-65.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1365; see also infra Part II.
ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT: MYTH AND REALITY 6 (1978).
See Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985); Ellsberg v. Mitchell,
709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1987); Halkin v. Helms
(Halkin II), 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635
F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980); Halkin 1,598 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1978).
In addition to the circuit court decisions that initially defined the contemporary
privilege, the Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities post-September II to
revisit the state secrets doctrine. However, in these instances, the Court has either
denied certiorari or no appeal has been sought after the circuit court decision. See
United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467,520 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
525 (2012); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir.
2010) (en bane), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); Doe v. CIA, 576 F.3d 95, 101-
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that these rules have been in place for decades with occasional
Supreme Court affirmation,40 it would seem that only the Supreme
Court has the authority to modify them substantially.
Because the state secrets privilege drew intense attention after
September 11 as never before,41 it may be assumed that the

40.
41.

02 (2d Cir. 2009); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574-76 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 560 U.S. 978 (2010); United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 131 (2d Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 54 (2013); United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 79 (2d
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1107 (2009); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d
296,302-03 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007); In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d
139, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1202
(9th Cir. 2007); Marriott Int'l Resorts v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
1093 (2006). See also infra app. 3 and the summary of the Supreme Court decisions
that follow in tbl.4.
See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1906 (2011); Tenet
v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1,8-10 (2005); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988).
See infra app. 1, tbIs.1 & 2; app. 2, tb1.3. One scholar summarized the development
as follows:
State secrets doctrine catapulted to prominence post-200!, as the
executive responded to lawsuits alleging a range of constitutional
and human rights violations by refusing to disclose information
during discovery and, in some cases, requesting dismissal of suits
altogether on national security grounds. More than 120 law
review articles followed, and media outlets became outspoken in
their criticism of the privilege. In both the Senate and the House,
new bills sought to codify what had previously been a common
law doctrine. And in September 2009, the Attorney General
introduced new procedures for review and created a State Secrets
Review Committee.
Donohue, supra note 22, at 78-79 (footnotes omitted). This increased attention to
Reynolds and the state secrets doctrine can be attributed to the number of national
security cases reviewed by district and circuit courts post-September II. While the
amount of district court cases citing to Reynolds spiked in the period from the mid1970s to early-1980s, since 2001, the number of district courts citing to Reynolds has
been steadily rising. See infra app. I, tbl.I. While in smaller amounts, the number of
circuit courts citing to Reynolds mirrors the district courts, with slight spikes of
increased citations to Reynolds during the late-1970s and early-1980s, but then more
steady and increased attention post-2000 (in particular, the amount of circuit court
citations to Reynolds increases most consistently after 2003). See infra app. 1, tb1.2.
Consider also the scant scholarly commentary regarding the state secrets doctrine
prior to September 11. See infra app. 2, tb1.3. In the 47 year period from 1953 to
2000, only approximately 250 articles were published citing to Reynolds (an average
of 5.3 articles per year). In 1999, for instance, only 16 law review articles cited to
Reynolds. However, following September 11, the heightened attention surrounding
national security generated much more scholarly commentary on the state secrets
doctrine. During the 12 year period from 2001 to 2013, approximately 315 law
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contemporary privilege became what it is today only after that epoch
defining moment. But such a view would be a misconception. The
courts of appeals defined the contemporary privilege in the 1970s and
1980s42 and those rules continue to form the framework for the
contemporary privilege. And although a few judicial decisions in the
last few decades have made some alterations in those doctrinal
ru1es,43 those changes were comparatively minor by comparison to
the rules set forth by the courts of appeals in their earlier decisions. 44
Nonetheless, although the contours of the state secrets privilege
were in place for two decades before September 11, there is no
question that the post-September 11 state secrets decisions have
drawn extensive attention. 45 This is not, however, because the
privilege expanded. Rather, it is because courts applied the privilege
to the highly controversial extraordinary rendition cases that arose
after September 11. Those cases not only created dissension among
judges but attracted substantial public attention. 46
While the national debate over extraordinary rendition did drive the
state secrets privilege into the center of the stage,47 it would be a
misjudgment to assume that the privilege will become less robust and
sweeping once the intensity of the War on Terror diminishes. That is
so because the current privilege pre-dated September 11 48 and the
same considerations that generated the privilege also generated th~
other doctrines that compose the Age of Deference. Thus, the

42.
43.

44.
45.

46.
47.

48.

review articles cited to Reynolds (an average of 26.25 articles per year). In 2009, the
amount of articles citing to Reynolds spiked to 45.
See infra Part II.A.
Compare Tenet, 544 U.S. at 11 (holding that in camera proceedings for the purpose of
determining whether the privilege applies are insufficient to accord the "absolute
protection" required), with Molero v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(determining validity of privilege claim based on in camera affidavit).
See infra Part II.A.
See infra app. 1, tbls.1 & 2; app. 2, tb1.3; see also Mohamed V. Jeppesen Dataplan,
Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442
(2011); EI-Masri V. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
947 (2007); Arar V. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), cert. denied,
560 U.S. 978 (2010).
See supra note 24.
See Frank Askin, Secret Justice and the Adversary System, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
745 (1991); Timothy Bazzle, Shutting the Courthouse Doors: Invoking the State
Secrets Privilege to Thwart Judicial Review in the Age o/Terror, 23 GEO. MASON U.
CIV. RTS. L.J. 29 (2012); John P. Blanc, A Total Eclipse 0/ Human Rights-Illustrated
by Mohamed V. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 114 W. VA. L. REV. 1089 (2012); D.A.
Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets
Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REv. 429 (2012); Frost, supra note 22, at 1931.
See supra notes 25-26.
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privilege and the Age of Deference are intertwined, and courts are
unlikely to restructure the privilege before they are willing to
reconsider the underpinnings of the Age of Deference, and as of now,
courts have not signaled any such reconsideration. 49
Although the scope of the privilege will not likely be altered before
judges are willing to rethink the Age of Deference, the privilege will
likely be invoked less frequently in future cases than it has been in
the past because both the Executive and the courts, in the wake of the
controversy over extraordinary rendition, seem to disfavor the
privilege. 50 As a result, a favored evidentiary privilege expanded to
protect the nation's security ironically has become a threat to the
nation's rule-of-law ideal, thus compromising its utility and making it
a legal doctrine of last resort5! in an effort to insulate the Executive
from meaningful judicial accountability.52
However, the disfavoring of the privilege does not mean that the
judiciary will hold the Executive more accountable in national
security cases in the future than it has in the past. Courts have used
numerous legal doctrines53 to construct a "balloon" that insulates the
Executive from meaningful judicial review in cases the Executive
asserts implicate the nation's security. When the scope of one
doctrine that constitutes the balloon of insulation is diminished--or
squeezed to follow through with the imagery-in the expectation of
increasing meaningful judicial review of the Executive, the effect is
that the displaced air merely enlarges the balloon at some other place.
This broadening of some other legal doctrine-such as standing or
pleading rules-thus serves to preserve the insulation of the
Executive. Built into the Age of Deference is a balloon effect the
consequence of which is that the Executive's insulation is more or
less constant no matter what modification may be made to anyone
doctrine that comprises the Age of Deference.
Nonetheless, the balloon effect should not dampen efforts to reform
the state secrets privilege. The current privilege denies arguably
wronged individuals judicial relief, erodes checks and balances
essential to the constitutional scheme, fails to hold the Executive
49.
50.
51.
52.

53.

See cases cited supra notes 6 & 39.
See infra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
See infra note 108.
But see Donohue, supra note 22, at 215-16 ("[T]he use of the state secrets privilege is
not going to subside."). Because Professor Donohue's research for this article ceased
in 2008 or 2009, it is possible that the turnabout mentioned above in the text had not
yet taken hold.
See supra notes 5-10.
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accountable for unlawful conduct, undermines the national
commitment to the rule of law, and threatens the legitimacy of the
jUdiciary.54
Moreover, not only is the robust and sweeping
contemporary privilege unnecessary to the preservation of the
nation's security, it may well diminish that security because it
compromises important national values, which are arguably vital to
the "soft-power" of the United States that contributes to its influence
around the globe. Accordingly, guidelines for restructuring the
privilege are set forth below and the consequences of that
restructuring for national security are assessed.
Lastly, this study contends that the frame of mind that has
generated the state secrets privilege is the same mind set that has
defined and sustained the Age of Deference. It is a mindset not only
committed to deference, but one that seems profoundly certain of its
correctness. 55 As a result, it is a mindset that has transformed a
nuanced disposition favoring deference into an extreme one that
resists intellectual engagement. Thus, the judiciary will not rethink
the state secrets privilege and its overall role in national security
cases until it is willing to rethink the underpinnings of deference. 56
Although such a rethinking is theoretically possible, it is unlikely to
occur in the near future because, as Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner
has noted: "Conservative judges are particularly unlikely to resist
claims of national security-and the federal judiciary may be more
conservative today than at any other time in the last half century.,,57
Until judges are intellectually open to reexamining the premises
underlying deference, the state secrets privilege and the other
doctrines that comprise the Age of Deference will continue to
undermine the judiciary's capacity to provide relief to injured
individuals, hold the Executive legally accountable, and make good
on the nation's fundamental ideal-that it is a nation under law.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See infra notes 254-266 and accompanying text.
See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011).
See infra Part III.
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY 9-10 (2006). For a report disclosing how Chief Justice John G. Roberts
Jr. has exercised his authority to appoint conservative judges to the secret court
established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and, thus, has enhanced the
deferential posture of the court so that, in the words of one commentator, the judges
may be "unduly accommodating to government requests," see Charlie Savage,
Roberts's Picks Reshaping Secret Surveillance Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/07/26/us/politics/robertss-picks-reshaping -secretsurveillance-court.html and Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Access to Government
Information is a Foundation of American Democracy-But the Courts Don't Get It,
65 OKLA. L. REv. 645 (2013).
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I. THE REYNOLDS PRIVILEGE

In order to take the full measure of the judicially engineered
expansion of the state secrets privilege, it is necessary to define the
baseline established by the Supreme Court's 1953 decision in United
States v. Reynolds. 58 That decision announced for the first time in the
history of the United States a set of rules that federal courts must
follow in adjudicating cases in which the executive branch claims the
state secrets privilege59 and those rules continue to this day to provide
a skeleton for the contemporary state secrets privilege. 60
The Court stated that only the government may assert the privilege
and that it should not be "lightly invoked.,,61 Moreover, the privilege
must be asserted "by the head of the department which has control
over the matter" and then only after the department head has had
"actual personal consideration" of the matter. 62 The Court stressed
that a "court itself must determine whether the circumstances are
appropriate for the claim of privilege,,,63 and that "[j]udicial control
over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers.,,64 The Court also stated that a court must try to
decide whether the privilege should be sustained "without forcing a
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.,,65 To
accomplish the twin goals of the Court assuring that it does not
abdicate control over the evidence to the "caprice of executive
officers,,,66 while not requiring the disclosure of the sensitive
information, the Court stated the following guideline:
It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the

circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the
privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize
the security which the privilege is meant to protect by

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

345 U.S. 1,7-10 (1953).
See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1366-68.
Id. at 1389-91.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9-10

48

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 44

insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the
judge alone, in chambers. 67
Lastly, the Court concluded that once a judge was convinced that
"military secrets are at stake,,,68 the privilege must be sustained no
matter how necessary and vital the information may be to the party
seeking access to it or how directly relevant the information may be
to matters of general public importance. 69
The Supreme Court in Reynolds characterized the privilege as
"well established.,,70 Though the doctrine certainly had historical
roots, which supported the claim that it was well established, the
privilege had been invoked only rarely and the few reported decisions
concerning the privilege were commercial cases between private
parties, and then mainly patent cases. 71 Thus, in support of its claim
that the state secrets privilege was "well established," the Supreme
Court cited only five cases,72 only one of which was a decision of the
Supreme Court-Totten v. United States,73 the so-called Totten
case-in which the government did not assert a state secrets privilege
and the Supreme Court did not even mention the privilege, let alone

67.
68.
69.

70.
71.

72.

73.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. See Chesney, supra note 22, at 1377-78, for a transcript of Hepting v. AT&T
Corp., 539 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008), which details an exchange between a
Circuit Judge and a Deputy Solicitor General in a case involving an alleged state
secret in which the line separating judicial "abdication" of its responsibility to
exercise some review over the Executive's claim that certain information qualified
under the privilege from judicial expressions of "utmost deference" is invisible.
345 U.S. at 6-7.
Id. at 2-3, 6-7 n.ll (commercial); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203, 204
(E.D.N.Y. 1949) (commercial); Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 587, 588
(S.D.N.Y. 1946) (commercial), mandamus denied, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947);
Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583, 583-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (patent);
Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353, 353-54 (E.D. Pa. 1912)
(patent).
The earlier state secrets cases did not establish the rules set forth in Reynolds. See
generally Cresmer, 9 F.R.D. at 204 (granting plaintiffs motion to produce
government report of air flight investigation because there was no "showing of a war
secret, or secret in respect to munitions of war, or any secret appliance used by the
armed force, or any threat to the National security"); Bank Line, Ltd., 68 F. Supp. at
588 (rejecting the claim of privilege because there was no threat to national security
involved); Pollen, 26 F. Supp. at 584-86 (finding the documents privileged because
"disclosure would be detrimental to the national defense"); Firth Sterling Steel Co.,
199 F. at 353-56 (finding the evidence was privileged on the grounds of public policy
since the contents contained military secrets).
92 U.S. 105 (1875).
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utilize it as a basis for the decision. 74 Thus, though the general idea
of a privilege did have historical roots, the detailed rules the Court
announced in Reynolds did not; those rules were crafted by the Court
and announced in Reynolds for the fIrst time. 75
In thinking about the Reynolds rules in light of the contemporary
state secrets privilege, several points are worth emphasizing. .First,
although the Reynolds rules tilted in different directions-rules
emphasizing that courts must maintain control over the application of
the rules of evidence and guard against Executive abuse of the
privilege, and rules directing courts to be so deferential to the
Executive's claims as to sustain the privilege in some cases without
reviewing the disputed document-within a few decades the circuit
courts effectively eliminated the doctrinal tension these opposing tilts
generated by effectively granting the Executive de facto absolute
control over whether disputed information or documents were
covered by the privilege. 76 Second, the Reynolds rule made the
privilege absolute in nature,77 meaning that once a court decided that
the disputed information or documents were covered by the privilege,
the privilege must be sustained no matter how comparatively
unimportant the threatened injury to national security might be or
how signifIcant the information might be to the allegedly injured

74.
75.

76.
77.

Id. at 107.
Professor Laura K. Donohue argues that with few exceptions, scholars, either before
or after the Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Reynolds, have not discussed "~he
history of state secrets in depth," and that failure has resulted in the "proliferation of
an Athena-like theory of state secrets: in 1953 it sprung from Zeus's forehead, with
little or no previous articulation." See Donohue, supra note 22, at 82-83. There is an
important difference between acknowledging that the common law evidentiary rule
authorizing a state secrets privilege had a history to it in both the United Statt;S and the
United Kingdom-a history that certainly meant that the Court in Reynolds did not
invent the concept of a state secret-and the claim that the detailed and convoluted
rules announced in Reynolds had no antecedents in the United States. The only prior
case that seems to have influenced Chief Justice Vinson's shaping of the rules in
Reynolds was a House of Lords decision: Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co" [1942]
AC. 624 (H.L.), and the influence of that opinion on the Supreme Court's ruling was
limited. Thus, from this perspective, and employing Professor Donohue's language,
Vinson's rules in Reynolds did indeed spring from "Zeus's forehead, with little or no
previous articulation." For a detailed discussion of the Reynolds decision and the
relationship between the Reynolds and the Duncan cases, see Rudenstine, supra note
3, at 1363-66, 1381.
See infra Part II.A.
See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1371-72.
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party. 78
Third, the Court in Reynolds applied the privilege
retrospectively to specific and concrete Air Force documents-an
investigation report into a plane crash and three witness statementsand although the Court sustained the privilege, it still permitted the
case to move forward, which ultimately meant that the plaintiffs were
given an opportunity to satisfy their evidentiary burdens with
evidence otherwise available to them. 79 And lastly, the Court in
Reynolds understood the privilege to be a common law rule of
evidence and not a constitutionally mandated privilege. 80
II. THE CONTEMPORARY PRIVILEGE
As noted, the Court in Reynolds gave the Executive de facto control
over what information was covered by the privilege;8\ made the
privilege absolute in character;82 applied the privilege retrospectively
to documents already identified;83 and, although the Court sustained
the privilege in Reynolds, it permitted the action to move forward,
thus effectively treating the privileged evidence as if a witness had
died. 84 Without doubt, the Reynolds outcome constituted a major
victory for government efforts to expand the veil of secrecy.
Nonetheless, the Court in Reynolds did not suggest that the privilege
could be properly used to shield unlawful conduct, or information
that was innocuous or harmless, or that a ruling sustaining the
privilege should result in the dismissal of an action in which a
plaintiff claimed that it could satisfy the evidentiary burden without
relying on privileged evidence. 85 But that is what the contemporary
privilege became in the 1970s and the 1980s; indeed, it became much
more than that.
A. Chronological Arc ofExpansion

During the years following the Reynolds decision the state secrets
privilege attracted some, but limited, attention from the courts and
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

The Reynolds rules invite abuse that courts fail to perceive. Thus, not only was the
privilege abused in Reynolds itself, but the highly influential opinion in Halkin II
reaffirmed the error of the Reynolds Court and concluded that the disputed documents
in Reynolds contained military secrets. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 990 n.53 (D.C. Cir.
1982) ("Reynolds itself involved a military secret.").
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 4-5, 11-12 (1953).
Id. at 6-7.
See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1371.
Id.
345 U.S. at 3-5.
!d. at 11-12.
See supra Part l.
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legal scholars until the presidency of Richard Nixon,86 at which point
several factors combined to bring about a change. 87 The executive
branch began to assert the state secrets privilege more frequently in
cases in which individuals claimed that government officials had
violated their constitutional rights and, perhaps, federal criminal
law. 88 In seeking protection from legal claims based on alleged
misconduct by executive officials, the executive branch argued for a
much broader state secrets privilege than previously authorized by
the Supreme Court. 89 Lower federal courts favorably responded to
such assertions of the privilege and expanded the scope of the state
secrets privilege well beyond the narrower parameters set forth by the
Supreme Court in Reynolds,90 and that expanded privilege provided a
springboard for the executive branch to assert the state secrets
privilege even more frequently than it previously had and to request a
still broader and more robust state secrets privilege. This dynamic
provided courts with opportunities to expand the privilege even
further. As they did so, the privilege became a more potent weapon
for the Executive to utilize 91 and, as the cases expanding the privilege
increased in number and scope, the mounting precedent made it that
much more difficult for judges to rule against the Executive's
assertion of the privilege. That pattern continued until the end of the
twentieth century92 and then intensified after September 11.93
The result is a sweeping privilege, which vastly expanded the
boundaries of the privilege so that what was initially an evidentiary
privilege with limited boundaries became a dynamic and powerful
weapon that the executive branch could use to dismiss lawsuits
86.

87.
88.

89.

90.
91.
92.
93.

This claim is supported by the number of case citations to Reynolds and the number of
law review articles devoted to the state secrets privilege during the almost two
decades following the 1953 Supreme Court decision in Reynolds. See infra apps. 1-2.
See Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1291, 1315-32 app.
See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir 1983), cert. denied, sub nom.
Russo v. Mitchell, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); Halkin 1,598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The Court authorized a relatively narrow state secrets privilege in Reynolds. See
Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 56; Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268,276 n.l
(4th Cir. 1980) (Phillips, J., concurring and dissenting); Halkin 1,598 F.2d at 9.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See generally app. 3, tbl.4 (showing a timeline of state privilege cases).
Some scholars have debated whether the administration of President George W. Bush
asserted the privilege more frequently than other administrations and/or whether its
assertion of the privilege was of a different character. See Limits of National Security
Litigation, supra note 22, at 1271 (concluding that the administration of George W.
Bush did not break with "past practice in asserting the privilege, either in quantitative
or qualitative terms").
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bef'ore the submission of a responsive pleading. 94 In other words, a
privilege that began as a surgical incision that excised from litigation
carefully defined evidence but otherwise left the action to proceed
forward has been transformed into an objection that the Executive
may assert at the very earliest stages of legal proceedings and which
may be the basis for dismissing an action altogether.
The vigorous expansion of the state secrets privilege was mainly
defined and implemented by the circuit courts, as opposed to the
Supreme Court,95 and more specifically, it was the Courts of Appeals
for the District of Columbia96 and the Fourth Circuie7 that primarily
pioneered the deve1opments. 98 Not only did these two courts give the
privilege a breathtaking sweep99 in their decisions, but they did so
quickly in a handful of cases decided within only a few years of one
another. And the judges who engineered the expansion wrote
opinions that presented the developments as if the reasoning and

94.

95.

96.
97.
98.

99.

See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296,
308 (4th Cir. 2007).
See Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1985);
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 63-64 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, sub nom.
Russo v. Mitchell, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); Halkin 11,690 F.2d 977, 995-96 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 270-72 (4th Cir. 1980);
Halkin 1,598 F.2d I, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
See, e.g., Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 51; Halkin 11,690 F.2d at 977; Halkin 1,598 F.2d at 1.
See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1236; Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., 635 F.2d at 268.
For example, in 1978, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied upon a
1972 Fourth Circuit decision, which did not involve the state secrets privilege at all, to
dismiss an action. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 8-9 (citing United States v. Marchetti, 466
F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972)). The court stated the state secrets privilege barred a
plaintiff from having the executive branch confirm or deny whether the government
had intercepted its communications on the basis of a "mosaic" theory, which posited
that "[t]housands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can be
analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole
must operate." Id. at 8. Two years later, the Fourth Circuit provided no authority
whatsoever for its order dismissing an action on the ground that plaintiff "would have
every incentive to probe as close to the core secrets as the trial judge would permit,"
and since the plaintiff and the other trial lawyers "would remain unaware of the scope
of exclusion of information determined to be state secrets," such probing presented an
unacceptable risk that state secrets would be disclosed. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., 635
F.2d at 281. In these two cases, two leading courts of appeals with jurisdiction over
territory, including the White House, the CIA, and the Pentagon, redefined the state
secrets privilege giving it a sweep that gave the Executive a major weapon in
litigation in which the privilege was implicated.
See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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outcomes in the cases were obvious, inevitable, and required by prior
decisions. 100
During the expansion of the privilege, very few circuit courts
narrowed the potential scope of the privilege, but to the extent that
there was such a narrowing, those opinions were reversed either after
an en banc hearing 101 or by the Supreme Court. 102 Moreover, in the
years following these early decisions, judges continued to apply and
occasionally expand the privilege lO3 even beyond the boundaries
demarked by the initial circuit court decisions. But, as important as
these subsequent expansions were, their scope was modest by
comparison to the expansion that occurred in the 1970s and the early
1980s. 104
During this development of the privilege, the Supreme Court
mainly limited itself to endorsing what the circuit courts did without
providing even a thoughtful discussion assessing the privilege in
general or in the particular case at hand. 105 Furthermore, although
this dynamic expansion of the state secrets privilege defines a
contemporary privilege that is well beyond the boundaries and scope
of the privilege's guidelines set forth in Reynolds, the Court has not
reconsidered the Reynolds decision in light of the expansion. 106
The consequence of this expansion is that the state secrets privilege
has come into sharp focus and legal scholars and commentators have
become intensely critical of the doctrine. In particular, these critics
have focused on the judiciary's failure to provide a remedy for
possibly wronged individuals in cases involving the state secrets
100. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
101. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 957-58, 962 (9th Cir. 2009),
rev'd en bane, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
102. See, e.g., Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
103. See, e.g., Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
104. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
105. Since Reynolds, the Court has cited Reynolds only twenty-three times. See infra app.
3, tbl.4.
106. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the state secrets privilege
numerous times since the Reynolds decision; however, it denied certiorari in many
instances. See United States v. EI-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011), eert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 525 (2012); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Datap1an, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc), eert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d
72 (2d Cir. 2008), eert denied, 559 U.S. 1107 (2009); EI-Masri v. United States, 479
F.3d 296 (4th Cir.), eert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338
(4th Cir. 2005), eert. denied, 546 U.S. 1093 (2006); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159
(9th Cir.), eert. denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998); In re United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C.
Cir.), eert. dismissed, 493 U.S. 960 (1989); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), eert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987).
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privilege and to fashion a set of rules that checked the executive
branch's use of the doctrine so as to minimize the risk of the
executive branch's "caprice" and abuse of the privilege.107 Indeed,
there is now evidence that the privilege is in such disfavor that the
Department of Justice characterizes it as a doctrine of last resort, 108
and that judges prefer other doctrines to the state secrets privilege in
shielding the Executive. 109
B. Shielding Unlawful Conduct
It is central to the American creed that the United States is
committed to a government ruled by law. 110 When John Marshall
wrote over two centuries ago that the United States is a "government
of laws, and not of men,,,lll he penned words that not only set forth a
national aspiration at the time but words that have echoed across the
eras of American history as setting forth one of the nation's most
fundamental commitments that has become part of America's identity
107.

108.

109.
110.

111.

See generally Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1249-50
(discussing Congressional reformation of the state secrets privilege to ameliorate its
impact); Frost, supra note 22, at 1931-32 (discussing plaintiffs' primary arguments
against the use of the state secrets privilege); Lyons, supra note 22, at 111-12
(arguing that the state secrets privilege is misused).
The brief filed on behalf of the United States in AI-Aulaqi v. Obama states,
"Consistent with the judicial admonition that the state secrets privilege be 'invoked no
more often or extensively than necessary,' the Court should not reach the privilege
issue if the case can be resolved on the preceding grounds .... " Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 43, AI-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C.
2010) (No. 10-CV-1469), 2010 WL 3863135 at *20 (citation omitted). Also, in Arar
v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), the trial judge relied upon the state secrets
privilege as a reason to dismiss the complaint, whereas the majority opinion in the en
banc decision narrowly construed the Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971), line of cases to preclude authorizing a
claim for relief based on Bivens, in the circumstances presented by Arar. But see
Charlie Savage & David E. Sanger, White House Tries to Prevent Judge From Ruling on
Surveillance Efforts, N.Y. TrMEs(Dec. 21, 20l3),
http://www.nytimes.coml2013/12/22/us!white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-onsurveillance-efforts.html.
See supra cases cited in notes 6-10.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. l37, 163 (1803); Barack Obama, President of the United
States, Speech at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech-ondrone-policy.html ("So after I took office, we stepped up the war against al Qaeda but
we also sought to change its course ... , We unequivocally banned torture, affirmed
our commitment to civilian courts, worked to align our policies with the rule of law,
and expanded our consultations with Congress.").
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163.

2014

The Courts and National Security

55

among the nations of the world. Nonetheless, during the last four
decades, courts-the very governing institution most responsible for
assuring that Marshall's admonition is respected throughout the
realm-have undermined this tenet by sustaining the state secrets
privilege to shield executive conduct that is arguably unlawful.
Two cases, separated by three decades, illustrate this point. In
1978, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
utilized the privilege to dismiss an action in which individuals and
organizations opposed to the United States military involvement in
Vietnam claimed that former federal officials as well as private
corporations acted in concert to conduct "warrantless interceptions of
their international wire, cable and telephone communications.,,112
The meaning of the dismissal meant-in the words of former Chief
Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit David L. Bazelon who submitted a dissent-that the state
secrets privilege "immunize [d] conduct that appears to be proscribed
by the Fourth Amendment,,,))3 and thus "becomes a shield behind
which the government may insulate unlawful behavior from scrutiny
and redress by citizens who are the target of the government's
surveillance.,,114
In a post-September 11 case-Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,
Inc.,115 decided by the Ninth Circuit in 201 O-five individuals
claimed that the CIA, working in concert with other government
agencies and officials of foreign governments, "operated an
extraordinary rendition program to gather intelligence by
apprehending foreign nationals suspected of involvement in terrorist
activities and transferring them in secret to foreign countries for
detention and interrogation by United States or foreign officials"116
by "methods that would [otherwise have been] prohibited under
federal or internationallaw.,,117 The plaintiffs alleged that Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., a U.S. corporation, had "provided flight planning and
logistical support services to the aircraft and crew on all of the flights
transporting each of the five plaintiffs among the various locations
where they were detained and allegedly subjected to torture." 11 8 In
relying upon the privilege to dismiss the complaint, Circuit Judge
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Halkin 1,598 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id. at 13 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 13-14.
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane).
Id. at 1073.
ld. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
ld. at 1075.
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Raymond C. Fisher framed the issue as a collision in fundamental
values between government under law and a secure government:
This case requires us to address the difficult balance the
state secrets doctrine strikes between fundamental principles
of our liberty, including justice, transparency, accountability
and national security. Although as judges we strive to honor
all of these principles, there are times when exceptional
circumstances create an irreconcilable conflict between
them. 119
The use of the state secrets privilege to shield arguably unlawful
executive conduct is a remarkable doctrinal development. After all,
if Congress is to pass statutes that establish the nation's laws, it
behooves the courts to make law that permits or even encourages the
Executive to violate those laws with impunity.
What explains this development? There was nothing in the
Reynolds decision and the early state secret cases cited in Reynolds
that authorized the use of the privilege to shield unlawful conduct. 120
Rather, in those early cases the state secrets privilege was applied in
tort, commercial, or patent cases,121 and, in the Reynolds case itself,
the privilege was applied to protect Air Force documents in a tort
action authorized by the Federal Tort Claims Act 122 against the
United States. 123 And while Reynolds did not explicitly prohibit the
extension of the privilege to shield unlawful executive conduct, it
surely did not mandate or invite the extension of the privilege and
there is nothing in the opinion that even suggests that the Reynolds
Court anticipated such a development. 124
119.

120.
121.

122.
123.

124.

Id. at 1073. Judge Fisher's frank acknowledgement that the state secrets privilege

shielded unlawful conduct is unusual. What is more common is the approach taken
by Judge Edwards in the Ellsberg case and Judge Scalia in the Moliero case-to just
ignore the issue.
E.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953).
See Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203,204 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Bank Line Ltd. v.
United States, 68 F. Supp. 587, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co.,
26 F. Supp. 583, 583-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 199 F. 353, 353-54 (E.D. Pa. 1912). But see Totten v. United States, 92 U.S.
105, 105-08 (1875) (holding state secrets barred an action for breach of contract
stemming from a contract made during the Civil War).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(I) (2012).
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2-3.
Apart from a few opinions written in the 1970s and the dissent in Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Hawkins J.,
dissenting), there are not many published judicial objections to the use of the privilege
to shield unlawful Executive conduct. Robert M. Chesney concluded similarly in
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Moreover, no one claims in defense of the judicially crafted
privilege that United States officials have a right to violate the law to
protect the national security. Obviously, there may well be a dispute
as to whether specified conduct does or does not violate the law, or
whether a particular defendant has 'a defense such as qualified
immunity.!25 But no one challenges the underlying premise that the
law must be obeyed. Nor have recent presidential administrations
taken the widely criticized position insisted upon by President Nixon
that an act that might otherwise be a violation of the law is not a
violation when the President orders it to guard the national
security,126 nor do they espouse a utilitarian rationale that maintains
that the protection of national security justifies breaking the law.
Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that there are important
differences between the Executive and the judiciary on this matter.
Federal judges who sustain the privilege to shield unlawful conduct
are not themselves committing an unlawful act, nor are they
responsible for directing such conduct. There is a difference between
courts not requiring the executive branch to disclose certain
information or documents that might be evidence of such unlawful
conduct and courts actually approving of unlawful executive conduct.
Nonetheless, these distinctions are not absolutions. The state secrets
privilege is a judge-made rule,127 allegations of unlawful executive
conduct are not new or even rare, and judges who sustain the
privilege in such cases do so knowing that they are shielding
arguably unlawful conduct and creating a dynamic that encourages
State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1252
("[T]he survey indicates that post-Reynolds efforts to categorically exclude
application of the privilege to suits alleging government misconduct did not gain
traction. ").
125. The Supreme Court discussed qualified immunity in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct.
2074 (2011).
126. Great Interviews of the 2dh Century, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2007, 5:18 AM),
(Interview
http://www.theguardian.comltheguardianl2007 /sep/07/ greatinterviews 1
with Richard Nixon and David Frost on May 20, 1977). For two recent examples of
presidential administrations not following in President's Nixon's footsteps, see
Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2013), http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/09/09/worldlmiddleeastlobama-tests-limits-ofpower-in-syrian-conflict.html, and Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the
United Nations Security Council seeking affinnation for the attack on Iraq because of
the alleged threat presented by the regime's possession of weapons of mass
destruction, Colin Powell, Sec'y of State, Address to the United Nations Security
Council (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.theguardian.comlworldl2003/feb/05/iraq.usa.
127. E.g., Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1094 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) ("The state
secrets doctrine is a judicial construct without foundation in the Constitution .... ").
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future unlawful conduct. In other words, what the courts have
knowingly done is to build into the functioning of the national
security state an insulating dynamic that pennits, if not invites, public
officials to violate the law with impunity.128 The consequence is that
courts have expanded the privilege-a privilege whose purpose was
to protect the nation and its ideals, including a commitment to a rule
of law-to the point where the privilege has become dangerous not
only to aggrieved individuals, but to the constitutional order, as well
as the moral legitimacy of the jUdiciary. 129
Against these considerations, it is difficult to do anything more
than to speculate about why courts not only expanded the state
secrets privilege to shield alleged unlawful conduct but why no
member of the Supreme Court has ever written a public opinion
criticizing the development or suggesting ways to minimize such use
of the privilege. But with that important caveat in mind, it does seem
that the use of the privilege to shield unlawful conduct is a direct
outgrowth of the mindset that generated the entire Age of Deference
itself; a mindset so deferential to the Executive in national security
matters that it not only has converted the federal courts into acting as
if they were an extension of the executive branch-and not an
independent and co-equal branch of government-but has also
persuaded the very judges whose primary mission is to uphold the
rule of law to betray that obligation for reasons the very same judges
decide are more significant. 130
128. See id. at 1073 (majority opinion).
129. See Limits o/National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1268.
130. In his memoir, William Colby recounts an incident that may shed some light on the
zeitgeist in Washington, D.C. when Halkin I was decided as well as other later cases
in which the state secrets privilege was used to shield unlawful conduct. WILLIAM
COLBY & PETER FORBATH, HONORABLE MEN: My LIFE IN THE CIA 389-400 (1978).
Colby tells of an exchange with Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller, who co-chaired a
blue-ribbon commission,-which became known as the Rockefeller Commissioninvestigating public claims that the CIA had violated federal law. Although Colby
maintained that the "CIA was not engaged in domestic spying or any other illegal
activity," id. at 393, as of 1975, the content of his statements to the commission were
"too open and candid for some people's tastes," id. at 400, and, as a result, after
giving testimony on one occasion:
Vice President Rockefeller[] drew me aside into his office ... and
said in his most charming manner, "Bill, do you really have to
present all this material to us? We realize that there are secrets
that you fellows need to keep and so nobody here is going to take
it amiss if you feel that there are some questions you can't answer
quite as fully as you seem to feel you have to.
ld. Colby wrote in his memoir that he understood Rockefeller disapproved of his
"approach to the CIA's troubles," and that he would have preferred Colby to "take the
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C. A Sweeping Privilege
During the last forty years, many distinct doctrinal developments l31
have combined to create a robust and sweeping expansion of the state
secrets privilege. The themes that compose the expansion are
theoretically distinct from one another,132 but in practice they are
interrelated, reinforce each other, and create a chain of thinking that
constitutes a dynamic and breathtakingly expansive state secrets
privilege. 133
1. Unacceptable Risks

The most threatening doctrinal theme to a party arguably wronged
by executive officials is the idea that the privilege must be sustained
and the entire action dismissed to avoid an ''unacceptable risk"134 that

131.
132.
133.

134.

traditional stance of fending off investigators by drawing the cloak of secrecy around
the Agency in the name of national security." Id.
In his study, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State,
Gary Wills places Colby's forthrightness in a political context that may well have
filtered through the judiciary and helped shape a perspective that made the use of the
state secrets privilege in such cases seem legitimate. Wills wrote that the "secret
subversions," which included sabotage, economic pressure and invasion, "were
guarded so carefully that their nickname in the Agency was 'the family jewels,'" and
that when Colby revealed secrets, "Agency loyalists and their right-wing supporters
treated this as an act of treason" for in so doing Colby "betrayed the protectors of the
nation." WILLS, supra note 2, at 177. Indeed, just to polish the point a bit more, Wills
wrote: "When Richard Helms defied Congress, and when William Casey lied to
Congress, they were considered the true patriots." Id.
See supra Part II.A for a chronological analysis of developments contributing to a
more expansive state secrets privilege post-Reynolds.
See infra Part III for examples of the themes: unacceptable risks, mosaic doctrine,
entanglement, and acknowledging, confirming, denying.
See generally Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[I]fthe 'very
subject matter of the action' is a state secret, then the court should dismiss the
plaintiffs action based solely on the invocation of the state secrets privilege.");
Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting
that even if the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case without resorting to
privileged information, allowing the case to proceed would pose such a threat to state
secrets as to warrant dismissal).
See generally Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1087-89 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (dismissing the action because of the "unacceptable risk" of
disclosing state secrets no matter what "protective procedures" might be employed);
EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308 (4th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he state secrets
doctrine protects sensitive military intelligence information from disclosure in court
proceedings, and that dismissal at the pleading stage is appropriate if state secrets are
so central to a proceeding that it cannot be litigated without threatening their
disclosure."); Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1144 (dismissing case because privileged and
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the litigation will inadvertently expose state secrets. By this
reasoning, the privilege is sustained not to guard against the
inevitable or even the highly likely disclosure of information that
satisfies the conditions of the privilege, but to guard against the
possibility that such information may be disclosed. Thus, it is
reasoned that an inquiry during litigation into non-sensitive
information, that itself does not disclose national security
information, but which is on the "periphery,,135 of sensitive
information, may invite lawyers "to probe as close to the core secrets
as the trial judge would permit,"136 and that during such probing, the
trial judge, seeking to prevent unintentional disclosure by a witness
under aggressive examination, may be so disadvantaged because the
boundary separating sensitive from non-sensitive information may be
so blurred that highly sensitive information is disclosed. 137 Because
of this risk of inadvertent disclosure, a judge may dismiss an action
before a responsive pleading is filed or discovery is commenced. 138
The unacceptable risk analysis requires a judge to make a
predictive decision regarding how lawyers and a judge will conduct
themselves during the course of a trial. Although predictive
decisions are vulnerable to the risk of error, judicial rulings applying
the unacceptable risk doctrine make little effort to reduce that error
by refining the concept of an "unacceptable risk," which leaves open
the possibility that any risk to any harm is unacceptable. 139 The result
is that judges possess broad, unstructured discretion in making these
decisions, and because those decisions involve undisclosed
information and are predictive in nature, the soundness of the judicial
decisions cannot be evaluated. 140

135.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

non-privileged material was inextricably linked); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.,
776 F.2d 1236, 1241-43 (4th Cir. 1985) (dismissing case based on the potential
danger of exposing state secrets when necessary expert witness had personal
knowledge of military secrets).
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980) ("Information
within the possession of the parties on the periphery of the suppression order would
not readily be recognized by counsel, unaware of the specific contents of the affidavit,
as being secret or as clearly having been suppressed by the general order of the district
court.").
Id.
See Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1082-83.
See id. at 1081.
See id. at 1083; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 304-05 (indicating that the state secret privilege
should be upheld when there is any "reasonable danger" that secrets will be exposed).
See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139,
153 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("It remains for the district court on remand to determine what
procedures would be required to safeguard against disclosure of privileged materials
and then to determine whether [the] lawsuit can proceed."); Bareford v. Gen.
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The unacceptable risk doctrine is a substantial expansion of the
state secret rules set forth in Reynolds. As noted, the Court in
Reynolds protected specifically defined and particularized
infonnation during the discovery stage of the case and left the action
otherwise intact to proceed until such time that it became
unequivocally plain that the plaintiff was unable to establish a prima
facie case without the information covered by the privilege. 141 In
contrast, the unacceptable-risk-of-disclosing-state-secrets line of
argument is predictive in character and it results in the dismissal of
the entire action. 142
Courts explain the early dismissal remedy-the limiting or cutting
off of litigation "to protect state secrets, even before any discovery or
evidentiary requests have been made"-by claiming that "waiting for
specific evidentiary disputes to arise would be both unnecessary and
potentially dangerous.,,143
The idea that a case should be dismissed to avoid the
"unnecessary" taxing of limited judicial resources and to avoid
wasteful expenses associated with litigation seems on its face totally
reasonable. l44 In general, there would be little justification for a
judge to indulge litigation that was truly "unnecessary." But whether
a legal action in which a state secrets privilege is asserted is
"unnecessary" depends entirely-at least in this context-on the
capacity of a judge to predict whether the litigation of the claims will

141.
142.

143.
144.

Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming the dismissal of
an action in the absence of a record of in camera proceedings in the district court);
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1241-42 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Due to
the nature of the question presented in th[e] action and the proof required by the
parties.to establish or refute the claim, the very subject of this litigation is itself a state
secret."); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., 635 F.2d at 281 (affirming the dismissal upon
. review of an in camera affidavit).
345 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1953).
See, e.g., Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1079. As the Ninth Circuit has stated
"the assertion of privilege will require dismissal because ... litigating the case to a
judgment on the merits would present an unacceptable risk of disclosing state
secrets." Id. The Fourth Circuit echoed those words in El-Masri: "a proceeding in
which the state secrets privilege is successfully interposed must be dismissed if the
circumstances make clear that privileged information win be so central to the
litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten that information's disclosure." 479
F.3d at 308.
Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d at 1081. The Court in Jeppesen also cites to
Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2005) to support this proposition. Id.
See generally Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d at 1081 (indicating that when it
becomes certain that state secrets would be divulged in an action, further litigation
would be "unnecessary.").
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risk the inadvertent disclosure of information injurious to national
security. Given that a judge would be in a far better position to
assess whether additional litigation of a particular action is
unnecessary by permitting the action to proceed,145 judges should
dismiss cases to reduce litigation costs only when the circumstances
make it certain that further litigation would be wasteful.
But conserving adjudicatory resources is not the major
consideration underlying the unacceptable risk doctrine. The primary
concern is that any further litigation will present an unacceptable risk
that sensitive information will be inadvertently disclosed. 146 While
this is an understandable consideration, the fear of inadvertent
disclosure seems greatly exaggerated since it is difficult to
understand how a mere submission of interrogatories or a request for
documents could be so "potentially dangerous" as to warrant
dismissal of a complaint in which an individual alleges kidnapping
and torture. It is equally difficult to understand how a witness being
deposed with an attorney (or several attorneys) in the room could
inadvertently disclose security information. 147 Moreover, given that
judges take almost as hallowed ground the assumption that the
judicial function is best performed in a concrete factual context,148 it
is peculiar for the courts to have fashioned a rule which puts a judge
145. See id. at 1095 (Bea, J., concurring) ("[W]hen responsive pleading is complete and
discovery under way, judgments as to whether secret material is essential to Plaintiffs'
case or Jeppesen's defense can be made more accurately.").
146. Id. at 1087 (majority opinion). In Jeppesen, the court, sitting en banc, stated that
plaintiffs' prima facie case and the defendant's defense "may not inevitably depend on
privileged evidence." Id. Or, to put the matter in a positive mode, the plaintiff may
be able to prove a prima facie case without relying upon information covered by the
state secrets privilege and the defendants may be able to mount complete defenses
relying on information not covered by the state secrets privilege. Nonetheless, the
court dismissed the complaint before a responsive pleading was filed on the ground
that "there is no feasible way to litigate [the defendant's] alleged liability without
creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets." Id. (emphasis added).
147. But see General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1904 (2011), in
which Justice Scalia stated that a former Navy official "revealed military secrets
neither side's litigation team was authorized to know," and that "[c]opies of the
unclassified deposition were widely distributed and quoted in unsealed court filings
until Government security officials discovered the breach a month later." The
reliability of Justice Scalia's factual assertions has been called into question by a
nationally prominent circuit judge. See Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of
Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REpUBLIC (Aug. 24,2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/magazinelbooks-and-arts/l 06441 Iscalia-gamer-reading-the-Iaw-textualoriginalism.
148. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992); Valley Forge Christian CoIl. v. Am. United, 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,528-30 (1961).
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in a disadvantaged position by requiring a predictive decision in a
comparatively abstract context. 149 But that is precisely what the
courts have done. ISO
2. Mosaic Doctrine
What is now termed the Mosaic theory had modest origins. lSI In
1972, the Fourth Circuit decided a dispute between a former Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent, Victor Marchetti, and the CIA over
the applicability of a secrecy agreement the former agent had signed
as a condition of his employment to a book Marchetti had writtenThe CIA and the Cult of Intelligence-that was scheduled to be
published by Knopf. 152 The court concluded that the secrecy
agreement, which barred Marchetti from disclosing "classified
information obtained during the course of [his] employment," which
was not already in the public domain, was valid. 153 Moreover, Circuit
Judge Haynsworth claimed that the courts should defer to executive
branch judgments regarding confidential information; he explained:
There is a practical reason for avoidance of judicial
review of secrecy classifications. The significance of one
item of information may frequently depend upon knowledge
of many other items of information. What may seem trivial
to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who
has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned
item of information in its proper context. The courts, of
149. See supra text accompanying notes 139-140. A dissent by Circuit Judge Francis D.
Murnaghan, Jr. of the Fourth Circuit makes plain the hazards of the unacceptable risk
analysis;
Any litigant in the Fourth Circuit whose proof is hampered by the
invocation of state secrets can hereafter be turned away from his
efforts to obtain justice on the questionable grounds that, for
reasons as to which he must remain uninformed, he might stumble
intrusively into a protected area.
The opportunities for
unexplicated imposition of arbitrary fiat under the rule the
majority adopts are potentially frightening.
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 282-83 (4th Cir. 1980)
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
150. See George, supra note 22, at 1697-99, for a discussion of this development.
151. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Halkin I,
598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) for a court's first use of the term "mosaic" to describe
the state secrets theory.
152. Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1311-12; VICTOR MARCHETTI & JOHN D. MARKS, THE CIA
AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE (1974).
153. Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1317.
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course, are ill equipped to become sufficiently steeped in
foreign intelligence matters to serve effectively in the
review of secrecy classifications in that area. 154
Thus, Haynsworth cautioned that judges should defer because they
were not competent to assess the sensitivity of tidbits of information
that arguably formed a mosaic. 155
Contemporary cases expanding the state secrets doctrine have used
Haynsworth's statements as a jumping off point to expand the state
secrets privilege by importing the mosaic theory into the privilege, 156
thus giving rise to the question of the degree to which the mosaic
theory should expand the privilege. By comparison to the Reynolds
decision-which was limited to information that itself presented an
allegedly unmistakable threat to national security-the utilization of
the mosaic theory by the state secrets privilege constitutes an
enormous expansion of the scope of the information protected by the
privilege. 157 Moreover, as it is now construed by the courts, the idea
of the theory-that only experienced individuals steeped in national
security can know if seemingly harmless tidbits of information can be
disclosed without causing harm-profoundly disables judges from
exercising meaningful review over executive judgments. 158 The
result is that the inclusion of the mosaic rationale into the state secrets
privilege greatly expands the scope of information that is potentially
protected by the privilege.
3. Entanglement
Circuit Judge Harry Edwards gave early expression to the
entanglement theme when he explained that the Supreme Court had
154. Id.at1318.
155. See id.
156. See, e.g., Kasza v. Brown, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that RCRA
claims against the Air Force risked exposing military secrets); CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S.
159, 178 (1985) (stating that the CIA director has the power to withhold superficially
innocuous information to protect the identity of an intelligence source); Halkin I, 598
F.2d at 8-9 (holding that the NSA does not need to release the identification of the
individuals or organizations whose communications the agency may have acquired).
157. Compare United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 -11 (1953) (holding that the state
secrets privilege may only be used when there is a "strong showing of necessity"),
with Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1170 (affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's claim because
proceeding on the merits may have revealed military secrets), Sims, 471 U.S. at 17374 (applying the mosaic theory to prevent the release of innocuous information to
protect intelligence sources), and Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 9 (holding that where
plaintiffs' action must be dismissed based on the mosaic theory).
158. See George, supra note 22, at 170O-nl, for a discussion of this development.
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stated that the state secrets privilege "is not to be lightly invoked,"
and thus "may not be used to shield any material not strictly
necessary to prevent injury to national security," which in tum
imposes an obligation on a court to disentangle "nonsensitive
information" from· "sensitive information" to permit the public
release of the nonsensitive information. 159
Courts have fallen considerably short of that aspiration. Judge
Rymer of the Ninth Circuit voiced the practical reality he thinks
judges confront in seeking to disentangle sensitive from non-sensitive
information: "The government may use the state secrets privilege to
withhold a broad range of information.
Although 'whenever
possible, sensitive information must be disentangled from
nonsensitive information to allow for the release of the latter,' courts
recognize the inherent limitations in trying to separate classified and
unclassified information.,,16o Judge Rhymer's despairing point was
made in even sharper language by Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth
Circuit:
Fitzgerald and Farnsworth Cannon recognize the practical
reality that in the course of litigation, classified and
unclassified infonnation cannot always be separated. In
some cases, it is appropriate that the courts restrict the
parties' access not only to evidence which itself risks the
disclosure of a state secret, but also those pieces of evidence
or areas of questioning which press so closely upon highly
sensitive material that they create a high risk of inadvertent
or indirect disclosures. 161

The perspective cautioning disentanglement rests on two lines of
analysis. 162 One is the mosaic approach. Pursuant to this perspective,
because innocuous information may unintentionally disclose missing
pieces of a mosaic that result in insights not previously understood,
judges must be mindful not to disentangle for fear of making an
error. 163 The second line of analysis concedes that non-sensitive
information may be identified, but maintains that because this
information may be on the "periphery" of sensitive information,
159. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir 1983).
160. Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at
57).
161. Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1992).
162. See supra note 98.
163. See Halkin 1,598 F.2d 1,8 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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judges may err in disentangling the information thus creating an
unacceptable risk. 164
The judicial paralysis arising from the entanglement theme assumes
that judges are not competent to distinguish sensitive from nonsensitive information-even assuming they can distinguish between
them-and to police the boundary between these two categories. In
However, as
short, judicial incompetence stymies judges. 165
discussed below, the judicial incompetence theme that streaks
through the state secrets privilege is exaggerated to the point of being
unpersuasive.
4. Acknowledging, Confirming, Denying
It is one thing for a court to sustain the executive branch's assertion
of the state secrets privilege to protect information that is
quintessentially military, diplomatic, or intelligence in character, and
it is quite another for a court to sustain the privilege so that the
executive branch is relieved from merely acknowledging the validity
or invalidity of information already in the public domain, which is
itself not a military, diplomatic, or intelligence secret, which does not
form part of a mosaic, and which is not implicated in the examination
of a witness in a public trial and does not create an unacceptable risk.
Nonetheless, that is what contemporary courts have done. 166 Thus,
although in a 1992 opinion Judge Higginbotham was plainly
concerned by the "troubling sweep" of the Executive's argument
based on an "acknowledgment" consideration, he sustained the
position: "The government maintains that, even if the data is
available from non-secret sources, acknowledgement of this
information by government officers would still be damaging to the
government, because the acknowledgement would lend credibility to
the unofficial data." 167
The previously discussed Balkin i 68 case provides a concrete
illustration of the "acknowledgment" development and, to appreciate
the extraordinary reach of the acknowledgment rationale, it is
necessary to examine the Balkin I opinion in detail. In that case, the
plaintiffs claimed that the National Security Agency (NSA) violated
their rights under the Constitution when it conducted warrantless
164.
165.
166.

167.
168.

See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 325-326 and accompanying text.
See Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1144 ("These cases stand for the proposition that disclosure
of information by government officials can be prejudicial to government interests,
even if the information has already been divulged from non-government sources.").
Id. (citing Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765-66 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
See supra text accompanying notes 112-114.
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interceptions of their international wire, cable, and telephone
communications.!69 "The Secretary of Defense avers that admitting
or denying the acquisitions would reveal important military and state
secrets respecting the capabilities of the NSA for the collection and
analysis of foreign intelligence.,,!70 More specifically, he claimed
that "if he were required to identify whose foreign communications
were acquired, or to disclose the dates or contents of the acquired
communications," the NSA's capabilities would be "jeopardized.,,!7!
The plaintiffs responded, "that the state secrets privilege cannot
extend to the 'mere fact of interception' of their communications,"
and argued that "admission or denial of the fact of acquisition of their
communications without identification of acquired messages would
not reveal which circuits NSA has targeted or the methods and
techniques employed.,,!72
The Court of Appeals sustained the Secretary of Defense's
position, and it did so by labeling the plaintiffs' position as "naIve,"
and asserting that a "number of inferences flow from the
confirmation or denial of acquisition of a particular individual's
international communications.,,!73 At that point, the court made a
series of claims to support its assertion that "[ a] number of inferences
flow from the confirmation.,,!74 The court stated that:
[T]he individual himself and any foreign organizations with
which he has communicated would know what circuits were
used . . .175 any foreign government or organization that has
dealt with a plaintiff whose communications are known to
have been acquired would at the very least be alerted that its
communications might have been compromised or that it
might itself be a target ... !76 [the] identification of which
plaintiffs' communications were and which were not
acquired could provide valuable information!77 as to what
circuits were monitored and what methods of acquisition
were employed ... [and the disclosures] of the identities of
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Halkin 1,598 F.2d 1,3 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id. at 3--4.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added). Notice that the court did not state that the disclosure "would"
provide such information.
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the intercepted parties "would enable foreign governments
or organizations to extrapolate the focus and concerns of our
nation's intelligence agencies. 178
The circuit court then stated that "[a] number of inferences flow
from the confirmation or denial.,,179 The language of this claim-that
a "number of inferences flow from the confirmation or denial" of the
intercepts I 8°-plainly means that the court has concluded that the
"inferences" will in fact result from the acknowledgement. But the
certainty of that general claim is not supported by the analysis that
follows, which is conjectural in character. Moreover, the harm
described in the other two sentences is almost identical to the harm
that would result if the plaintiffs merely disclosed how they
communicated with whom and when. As for the harm described in
the two sentences written in conjectural terms, that harm is also
identical to the harm that would result from plaintiffs' actual
disclosure, except for revealing what the court terms the "methods of
acquisition,,,181 and then it is not at all clear why acknowledgment
would in fact disclose "methods."
The court also incorrectly assumed that the information that it
identified as harmful would be disclosed only if the government was
required to confirm or deny the alleged interceptions. 182 The
plaintiffs could disclose those facts. The plaintiffs knew how it had
communicated, with whom it had communicated, and when it had
done SO.183 Thus, while only some of plaintiffs' communications
might have been intercepted, plaintiffs' disclosure of this information
would have alerted foreign governments and organizations that at
least some communications were being intercepted, and it would
have identified the means of communications that were subject to
interception. Thus, the importance of the government's confirmation
or denial of the interceptions boils down to the difference between
what information would be disclosed if, on the one hand, the
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

183.

Halkin 1,598 F.2d at 8 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Other courts have made this assumption as well, focusing not on the ability of the
plaintiff to disclose harmful information but on the harm caused by government
acknowledgment of potentially sensitive information. See, e.g., Bareford v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The government maintains
that, even if the data is available from non-secret sources, acknowledgment of this
information by government officers would still be damaging to the government,
because the acknowledgment would lend credibility to unofficial data.").
Halkin 1,598 F.2d at 8.
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government was required to confinn and deny, and on the other hand,
the plaintiff disclosed what infonnation it possessed. Whatever the
totality of this infonnation may be, it is certainly much less than the
totality of infonnation described by the circuit court. 184
The Executive consistently claims that confinning, denying, or
acknowledging certain infonnation will compromise national
security.18S That may well be correct with regard to some infonnation
in some contexts, but it certainly is not a convincing position in all
contexts. Yet out of deference to the Executive, courts do seem very
willing to defer to such Executive assertions. And when this dynamic
is combined with the other three themes-unacceptable risk, mosaic
and entanglement-the sweeping character of the modem state
secrets privilege is apparent.
5. Allocation of Burdens
In the last decades, courts have extended the Reynolds rule from a
privilege that keeps infonnation from a plaintiff to a privilege
pertinent to infonnation sought by the defendant. 186 By itself, such an
extension is an appropriate application of the Reynolds rule. But
courts have construed this extension so that the burdens of the
privilege fall exclusively on the plaintiff. 187
The baseline rule for assigning the burden of the privilege when the
information in dispute is pertinent to the defendant was set forth by
Circuit Judge Max Rosenn: "If ... the infonnation related not to the
plaintiffs claim, but rather to the defense, summary judgment against
the plaintiff is proper if the district court decided that the privileged
infonnation, if available to the defendant, would establish a valid
defense to the claim."188 Circuit Judge Higginbotham characterized
the basic rule this way: with few but notable exceptions, most courts
have concluded that if the state secrets privilege "would establish a
valid defense, then the court ought to dismiss the plaintiffs' case,,,189
or if the state secrets privilege would "deprive[] the defendant of
information that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense

184. Id.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
186. See, e.g., Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1143; Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 825 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
187. See, e.g., Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1143.
188. In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 476 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., United
States v. Albertson, 493 U.S. 960 (1989).
189. Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1143.
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to the claim, then the court may grant summary judgment to the
defendant." 190
Some courts have expanded the application of the rule. 191 These
courts have decided that a defendant may benefit from a summary
judgment or a dismissal ruling even if the information in dispute will
only "hamper" a defendant in establishing a defense or curtail a cross
examination of a plaintiffs witness as opposed to denying a party of
a complete and valid defense. 192 Thus, Judge Winter of the Second
Circuit wrote in Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp.: "Similarly,
it has been held that, if the court determines that the privilege so
hampers the defendant in establishing a valid defense that the trier is
likely to reach an erroneous conclusion, then dismissal is also
proper." 193 More recently, an en banc Ninth Circuit opinion further
stretched these already extended rules. 194 There, the majority
reasoned:
[W]e do not hold that any of the documents plaintiffs have
submitted are subject to the privilege; rather, we conclude
that even assuming plaintiffs could establish their entire case
solely through nonprivileged evidence-unlikely as that
may be-any effort by Jeppesen to defend would
unjustifiably risk disclosure of state secrets. 195
Sustaining the state secrets privilege imposes a serious burden, and
as is apparent, courts do not parcel out the burdens between the
plaintiff and the defendant. Thus, a plaintiff who claims that it can
establish a prima facie case relying only on information in the public
domain may have its complaint dismissed because litigation pertinent
to the defense may result in an unacceptable risk of disclosing
national security information, and, a defendant, whose capacity to
cross examine a witness may be hampered by the privilege, may be
entitled to have plaintiff s case dismissed. Either way the defendant

190. Id. at 1141 (citing In re United States, 872 F.2d at 476; Maleria, 749 F.2d at 825).
19l. See, e.g., Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991);
Maleria, 749 F.2d at 825.
192. See Barefard, 973 F.2d at 1138; Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547.
193. Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547 (emphasis added) (citing Maleria, 749 F.2d at 825).
194. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
195. Id. at 1090 (second emphasis added). The Jeppesen majority at this point cited ElMasri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 310 (4th Cir. 2010) for the proposition that
"virtually any conceivable response [by government defendants to claims based on
factual allegations materially identical to this case's] ... would disclose privileged
information." (alteration in the original). Id.
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prevails. 196 Thus, while the extension of the privilege to information
sought by a defendant is appropriate, the allocation of the burden
resulting from the privilege solely to the plaintiff is at odds with basic
fairness.
6. A New Justiciability Twist
In two opinions, one in 1981 197 and one in 2005,198 Justice William
Rehnquist linked the state secrets privilege to a new justiciability
grounds. In the 1981 decision, Weinberger v. Catholic Action of
Hawaii/Peace Education Project, the Supreme Court concluded that
neither the National Environmental Policy Act nor any regulatory
provisions required the Navy to prepare and release an environmental
impact statement resulting from the construction of several weapons
storage structures capable of storing nuclear weapons. 199 The Court
argued that the Act's public disclosure requirements were governed
by provisions of the Freedom of Information Act which generally
subordinated the public's interest in ensuring that federal agencies
comply with the Act to the Executive's need to protect national
security secrets. 200
Furthermore, because national security
considerations prevented the Navy from confirming or denying that it
proposed to store nuclear weapons at the facility, it had not been and
it could not be established that the Navy proposed an action that
required it to file solely for "internal purposes" an environmental
impact statement. 201
Although those reasons constituted sufficient grounds on which to
base the result in the case, Justice Rehnquist took a doctrinal step that
enlarged the potential scope of the state secrets privilege by turning it
from an evidentiary privilege that protected specified information
into a new justiciability doctrine. 202 The relevant doctrinal footwork
occurred in a short paragraph in which Rehnquist quoted from a
nineteenth century opinion-Totten v. United Statel'°3-involving a
claim by the estate of a Civil War spy against the United States for
unpaid compensation and then cited to the state secrets Reynolds
196. The seeming unfairness of this result is rarely acknowledged by the courts. But see
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268,271-73 (4th Cir. 1980).
197. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw.lPeace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
198. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
199. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 146-47.
200. !d. at 145-47.
201. Id. at 146.
202. See id. at 146-47.
203. Id. (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876)).
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opinion as if it were in accord with the quotation from the Totten
decision:
Ultimately, whether or not the Navy has complied with
[National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)] "to the fullest
extent possible" is beyond judicial scrutiny in this case. In
other circumstances, we have held that "public policy
forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the
trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of
matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and
respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be
violated." Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107, 23
L.Ed.605 (1876). See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,
73 S. Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953). We confront a similar
situation in the instant case. 204
A quarter century later, Chief Justice Rehnquist pushed this
doctrinal opening forward one more step in Tenet v. Doe. 205 In
reversing the Ninth Circuit in an espionage case, he argued that the
Circuit Court was "quite wrong" in concluding that the Totten ruling
did not require the dismissal of the action. 206 Claiming that the Ninth
Circuit had construed Totten to announce "merely a contract rule,,,207
Rehnquist asserted that "Totten was not so limited,,208 because it had
included a statement that provided: '" [P]ublic policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself
regards as confidential. ",209 Rehnquist sought to support such a
drastic ruling by arguing that the state secrets privilege and the "more
frequent use of in camera judicial proceedings simply cannot provide
the absolute protection we found necessary in enunciating the Totten
rule.,,210
Rehnquist's opinion in the Tenet case blurred the Reynolds state
secrets privilege with the Totten justiciability ruling. Thus, according
to Rehnquist, dismissal-as opposed to protecting the confidentiality
of national security information-was required in espionage cases not
to prevent the disclosure of state secrets but because of the nature of

204. Jd.
205. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2005).
206. Id. at 8.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875».
210. Jd. at 11.
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the subject matter. 2l1 In Tenet, Rehnquist surely did not state that all
cases involving state secrets were henceforth non-justiciable, but he
opened the door to that development, and some years later, two
circuit courts walked through that opening and further blurred the
distinction between an evidentiary and justiciability ruling.212
7. Constitutional Basis for the Privilege
The brief filed on behalf of the United States in the Supreme Court
in the Reynolds case strenuously argued in favor of a broad
constitutionally mandated executive privilege.213 Accordingly, it is
not possible that the high court overlooked the main argument put
forward by the Executive, and yet, the Reynolds opinion did not state
that what it terms "the privilege against revealing military secrets"
was constitutionally mandated. 214 It does, however, state that both
parties make claims that have "constitutional overtones,,,215 a phrase
that, while having no definite meaning, certainly does not mean that
the positions of each party is constitutionally based, for if it did,
Chief Justice Vinson would not have resorted to the ambiguous and
unconventional word "overtones.,,216
More importantly, the Vinson opinion makes it perfectly plain that
the evidentiary rule it announced in Reynolds was not constitutionally
based.217 It did that in the very sentence it used the amorphous phrase
"constitutional overtones" when it stated that, "we find it unnecessary
to pass upon" the parties arguments that have constitutional overtones
because there was "a narrower ground for decision.,,218 Thus, given
211. See id. at 9-10.
212. See id. at 3; Mohamed v. Jeppesen Datap1an, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077-78 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc); E1-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d at 310-11 (4th Cir. 2007). For
two circuit court decisions rendered between Weinberger and Tenet blurring a rule of
evidence with a justiciability ruling, see Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159,1166-67
(9th Cir. 1998), and Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814,815-16
(9th Cir. 1989). See also Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th
Cir. 1992); Bowles v. United States, 950 F.2d 154, 156 (4th Cir. 1991); Guong v.
United States, 860 F.2d 1063, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Frost, supra note 22, at 193940; Wells, supra note 22, 637--40; Christopher D. Yamaoka, Note, The State Secrets
Privilege: What's Wrong with It, How It Got That Way, and How the Courts Can Fix
It, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 139, 149-50 (2007).
213. Brief for Petitioner at 53, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (No. 21), 1952
WL 82378, at *53.
214. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,6 (1953).
215. Id.
216. Id. .
217. Id.at7-1O.
218. Jd. at 6.
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that the Reynolds majority considered the Executive's argument as
having only "constitutional overtones," and thus something less than
a constitutionally based argument, it stands to reason that the Court's
reference to a "narrower ground" was a reference to a ground based
on the common law.219 This position is further supported a few
sentences later in the opinion when the Court stated that the privilege
it was assessing was "well established in the law of evidence.,,22o
Putting the matter this way was clearly intended by the Court to
distinguish the common law character of the privilege from the
constitutionally based character of a privilege that was rooted in
"inherent executive power,,221 and "protected in the constitutional
system of separation of power,,,222 which is how Vinson characterized
the executive branch's description of a recordkeeping statute. 223
Moreover, although Vinson did cite to the Totten case, the result in
Totten was not based on the Constitution, and the other cases cited by
Vinson to support the claim that the privilege was "well established"
were all common law based opinions.224
After Reynolds, the next judicial development that in any way
related to the common law basis of the state secrets privilege was the
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Nixon,225 involving the
special prosecutor's subpoena duces tecum of President Nixon's Oval
Office tape recordings in the famous Watergate scandal tapes case
that resulted in President Nixon's resignation of the presidency,z26 In
that opinion, the Court rejected President Nixon's claim that the
President was immune from judicial process, or, in the alternative,
that the President's claim of executive privilege was an absolute
privilege. 227 But the Court concluded for the first time that the
President's claim of an executive privilege was constitutionally based
and it reached that conclusion even though the Constitution itself was
silent on the matter. 228
The Court based its conclusion on two grounds. First, the Court
concluded that presidential communications in the exercise of Article
See id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id.at6,n.9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6-7, n.11.
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 687-88; see also K.A. McNeely-Johnson, United States v. Nixon, Twenty Years
After: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly-An Exploration of Executive Privilege, 14
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 251, 278 (1993).
227. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705-07, 709-11.
228. See id. at 705-06.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
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II powers were constitutionally protected because each of the three
branches of government was supreme "within its own assigned area
of constitutional duties,,,229 and, as a result, "certain powers and
privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers, ,,230 and the
"protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has
similar constitutional underpinnings.,,231
Second, the Court
suggested, without explicitly concluding, that the President's claim of
executive privilege was also rooted in the doctrine of separation of
powers.232
It was against these conclusions that the Court then made
comments with regard to military and diplomatic secrets, the role of
the courts in matters that may involve such secrets, and the state
secrets privilege, which gave fresh vitality to an expansive use of the
controversial doctrine.233 The Court did this by first noting that
President Nixon did not "place his claim of privilege on the
ground,,234 that the communications in dispute involved "military or
diplomatic secrets.,,235 If the President had made such a claim, the
Court reasoned that "the courts have traditionally shown the utmost
deference to Presidential responsibilities,,236 and, in support of such
"utmost deference," the Court quoted from an opinion by Justice
Robert Jackson, who actually dissented in the Reynolds case.237 The
Court then followed that quote with one from the Reynolds case
emphasizing the importance, in matters affecting national security,
for the disputed information not to be reviewed even by a judge alone
in chambers. 238
Id. at 705.
Id.
Id. at 705-06.
See id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing C & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, III (1948)). The
referenced quote reads:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's
organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose
reports neither are nor ought to be published to the world. It
would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information,
should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken
on information properly held secret.
Waterman s.s. Corp., 333 U.S. at Ill.
238. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710-11 (1974) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, 10
(1953)).

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
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As important as statements in the Nixon case may be for indicating
that the Executive, as a matter of constitutional authority, may in
some circumstances withhold certain information from the judiciary,
the import of that ruling does not constitutionalize the state secrets
evidentiary rules. Those rules encompass much more than the
Executive's authority merely to withhold information; they
encompass a range of doctrines reviewed above, such as the
unacceptable risk doctrine, the mosaic doctrine, the entanglement
analysis, the resistance to having the Executive confirm or deny,
remedial expansion, as well as the rules set forth by Chief Justice
Those aspects of the
Vinson in the Reynolds opinion. 239
contemporary state secrets privilege are part and parcel of the
common law evidentiary privilege. 24o
Nonetheless, that has not kept the Fourth Circuit from seeking to
root the state secrets rules in the Constitution. 241 In EI-Masri v.
United States, the panel stated: "Although the state secrets privilege
was developed at common law, it performs a function of
constitutional significance, because it allows the executive branch to
protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its military and
foreign-affairs responsibilities.,,242
This is no academic debate. If the state secrets privilege is a
common law privilege, Congress may regulate it; if it is a
constitutionally based privilege, Congress may only regulate that part
of the privilege that courts conclude are not constitutionally based. 243
In the struggle between those wishing to protect the privilege as
currently defined from congressional regulation and those seeking to
curtail the privilege, the character of the privilege-whether it is a
common law privilege or constitutionally based-makes all the
difference.

***
The expansion of the state secrets privilege beyond the boundaries
of the Reynolds paradigm was sweeping and swift, and resulted from
judicial discretion. Moreover, even assuming that courts in the 1970s
and 1980s were strongly inclined to be deferential towards the
Executive, they were not required to give the privilege the broad

239. See supra Part II.C.I-4.
240. See supra Part II.C.I-4.
241. 479 F .3d 296, 303-05 (4th Cir. 2007).
242. Id. at 303.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 217-224.
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sweep they did. 244 Indeed, if the courts had placed emphasis on the
Supreme Court's admonitions in the Reynolds opinion that the
privilege not be invoked "lightly,,,245 that "[t]he court itself must
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of
privilege,,,246 and that "[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers,,,247 the
expansion of the privilege would have been modest by comparison to
what it has become. Thus, there was nothing inevitable or preordained about the extensive expansion of the state secrets privilege
during the last four decades; it resulted solely from the exercise of
judicial discretion. 248
D. Consequences of the Contemporary Privilege

The sweeping contemporary state secrets privilege generates many
harmful consequences. 249 To begin with, the idea that an individual
may seek relief for a legal wrong in a court is a bedrock principle of a
modem civilized society.250 And in the United States, as one judge
has stated, "for better or worse,,,251 courts are central to granting relief
to individuals seeking redress.252 Woodrow Wilson paid tribute to
these values in his classic study Constitutional Government in the
United States: "So far as the individual is concerned, a constitutional
government is as good as its courts; no better, no worse. Its laws are
only its professions. It keeps its promises, or does not keep them, in
its COurtS.,,253 Thus, the courts' creation and construction of the state
secrets privilege undermines· this promise and places a wedge
between the nation's practice and its aspiration.
Next, as reviewed above/54 the state secrets privilege may shield
executive officials who have not only violated the rights of an

244.

See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972); Dep't of Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).
245. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,7 (1953).
246. Id. at 8.
247. Id. at 9-10.
248. See id. at 7-10.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 12-27.
250. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
251. Arar Y. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 638 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
252. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163.
253. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 17
(Columbia Univ. Press 1908).
254. See supra Part II.B.
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individual, but may have violated the federal criminal law.255 The
consequence of such rulings is to permit such officials to escape
accountability to the injured individual, and perhaps to permit the
same officials to escape any liability for violating the criminallaw. 256
Indeed, it is even possible that the elimination of accountability
creates a dynamic that may invite executive officials who are charged
with enforcing the law to ignore legal norms in the future.
Furthermore, central to the constitutional plan is the idea that
unaccountable concentrated power invites abuse and that such abuse
undermines democratic processes and threatens individual liberty.257
By itself, the state secrets privilege does not constitute a major threat
to the complicated constitutional structure that rests on the three coequal branches of government checking and balancing the exercise of
power. But the sweep of the contemporary privilege does make its
own distinct contribution to this harmful trend.
When a court utilizes the privilege to dismiss an action in which a
party asserts egregious claims-as in an extraordinary rendition
case-not only do the courts seem as if they are washing their
hands 258 of the matter, but they may well seem as if they are bowing
to Executive authority/59 if not complicit in the underlying
conduct. 260 Although it is uncertain the degree to which such
outcomes undermine the public's trust in the courts and erode their
legitimacy, it is worth recalling Justice John Paul Stevens'
observation regarding the confrontation between the Supreme Court
and President Nixon over whether the courts had the authority to

255.

For an example of instances where federal criminal law may have been violated due to
the state secrets privilege, see cases cited supra note 13.
256. See supra note 13.
257. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,742 (2008); Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579
(1952); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); see also SHANE, supra note 15.
258. The allusion is to Pontius Pilate, who, in response to demands that Jesus be crucified,
"took water and washed his hands before the crowd, saying, 'I am innocent of this
man's blood: see to it yourselves.'" Matthew 27:24. Judge Fisher's majority opinion
in Jeppesen dismissing a complaint alleging extraordinary rendition, although surely
intended to be constructive, brings to mind the Pontius Pilate Biblical episode when
he wrote: "Our holding today is not intended to foreclose-or to pre-judge-possible
nonjudicial relief, should it be warranted for any of the plaintiffs." Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
259. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I
(1942), for examples in which the judiciary is thought to have bowed to Executive
authority.
260. See supra Part ILB.
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require Nixon to "produce the tape recordings that eventually led to
his resignation.,,261 He wrote:
The decision not only had a [sic] historic effect on American
politics and society but also powerfully illustrated the
integrity and independence of the Court. It may well have
done more to inspire the confidence in the work of judges
that is the true backbone of the rule of law than any other
decision in the history of the Court. 262
If Justice Stevens is correct, the Court gains public trust when it
takes its independence seriously and holds the Executive legally
accountable. The courts' sweeping utilization of the state secrets
privilege runs directly counter to Justice Steven's counsel.
More generally, there is a fundamental inconsistency between the
privilege and the idea that the President is not "above the law" as
well as the national commitment to the rule of law. A little more than
two centuries after Chief Justice Marshall penned his famous opinion
in Marbury v. Madison/ 63 President Barack Obama told the nation:
In all that we do, we must remember that what sets America
apart is not solely our power-it is the principles upon
which our union was founded. We're a nation that brings
our enemies to justice while adhering to the rule of law, and
respecting the rights of all our citizens. 264
And ten months after that, in a speech at Harvard Law School, the
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Stephen W.
Preston, stated that "the President has made clear that ours is a nation
of laws, and that an abiding respect for the rule of law is one of our
country's greatest strengths, even against an enemy with only
contempt for the law.,,265 To emphasize that the CIA too was under
that national mandate to be a nation committed to the rule of law,

261.

JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 114 (2011). See supra
note 24 for the critical commentary on the state secrets doctrine.
262. STEVENS, supra note 261, at 114.
263. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
264. Press Release, President Barack H. Obama, Statement by the President on the Way
Forward in Afghanistan (June 22, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/20 11 106/22Iremarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan.
265. Stephen W. Preston, Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intel. Agency, CIA and the Rule of Law,
Speech at Harvard Law School (Apr. 10,2012), in 6 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'y 1,
1 (2012).
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Preston stated that "This is so for the Central Intelligence Agency no
less than any other instrument of national power engaged in the fight
against al Qaeda and its militant allies," and that the "CIA is an
institution of laws, and the rule of law is integral to Agency
operations. ,,266
Over decades the Supreme Court translated these ideals into legal
norms. Thus, the Court has ruled that evidence obtained by an
unconstitutional search must be suppressed in criminal cases, even if
that results in the release of the criminal, on the ground that
"[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws . . . . ,,267 Similarly, the Court ruled that a
defendant must be given "Miranda Rights" and that a confession
must be suppressed if not procured in compliance with the Miranda
rules. 268 The Court also requires the state to provide a lawyer to an
indigent charged with a felony at the state's expense to give meaning
to the ideal of the rule of law. 269 In civil cases, the Court provides a
remedy against state and local officials, as well as private parties,
acting under color of law, for the deprivation of federal rights. 270 The
Court has fashioned a remedy against federal officials that deters
future conduct that violates individual constitutional rights, because,
as Justice Harlan wrote: "[I]t is important, in a civilized society, that
the judicial branch of the Nation's government stand ready to afford a
remedy in these circumstances.,,27!
The state secrets privilege stands in contradiction to this tradition,
and its use threatens to undermine the legitimacy not only of the
courts but the Executive.272 Indeed, both governmental branches'

266. ld.
267. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). In an earlier opinion, Justice Brandeis
wrote: "Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example . . .. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
268. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444-45 (1966).
269. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963).
270. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) ("[I]nsofar as it holds that
local governments are wholly immune from suit under § 1983.").
271. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-20 (1980);
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1979).
272. See Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1252 (examining the lack
of published opinions involving allegations of government misconduct where the
privilege has been employed).
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reluctance to rely on the privilege seems to signal recognition of the
privilege's corrosive effect. 273

III. RESTRUCTURING THE PRIVILEGE
Before reviewing recommended guidelines for restructuring the
privilege, it is important to emphasize that it is entirely possible for
courts to be responsibly deferential to the Executive without
becoming a "rubberstamp,,274 for executive judgments and without
supplanting executive judgments supported by concrete evidence and
reasonable considerations. That is so because the concept of judicial
deference is elastic and fluid and the various constructs of deference
fall out along a spectrum that runs from extreme deference to no
deference with many reasonable stopping points in between.275 The
guidelines set forth below for restructuring the privilege are intended
to define a state secrets privilege courts may enforce without being
inappropriately deferential or intrusive. 276
A. Defining the Scope of the Privilege

The current rules guiding the privilege have vested the Executive
with de facto absolute authority to decide what information should be
covered by the privilege. 277 If the privilege is to be brought under
responsible judicial authority, judges must define the phrase "state
secrets," and that definition should include three elements.
273. See Chesney, supra note 22, at 1315-32 (outlining published opinions adjudicating
assertions of the privilege post-Reynolds).
274. ld at 1377 (quoting Judge Harry Pregerson in an argument before the Ninth Circuit in
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008».
275. Although this approach to the idea of deference may be obvious, it is not always
acknowledged. Thus, even a highly respected scholar is capable oftuming the elastic
concept of deference into an either/or dichotomy-that is, a court is either deferential
or it is not deferential. See id at 1363 ("Ultimately, I conclude that many arguments in
favor of deference are unpersuasive, but that deference nonetheless may be justified in
limited circumstances.").
276. On September 23, 2009, the Obama Administration announced new "Policies and
Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege" that would be
administered by the Department of Justice. See Memorandum for Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Memorandum for the Heads of Department Components,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (Sept. 23, 2009),
http;llwww.justice.gov/opaidocuments/state-secret-privileges.pdf.
The initiative
effectively acknowledges the abuse of the privilege and the need for the Executive to
impose some control over its invocation in the courts. As constructive as that step is,
the new policies do not change the rules and procedures courts follow in adjudicating
conflicting claims over the Executive's assertion of the privilege in a particular case.
277. See WILLS, supra note 2, at 138.
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First, the definition must address what kind of information
constitutes a state secret. 278 A state secret should protect information
such as the development and location of weapons, the location of
troops, bases and military equipment, current military contingency
plans, important on-going intelligence operations and methods of
securing intelligence, and current diplomatic relations pertaining to
significant national security matters. 279 In contrast, the term state
secret should not privilege information merely because it is
classified,280 discloses information that would be embarrassing to a
department, agency or one or more officials,281 discloses conduct by
executive branch officials that violated federal criminal law, or
discloses information that would create an alleged risk of injury to
the nation's security where that risk is insignificant, improbable and
unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. 282
Second, the privilege should be sustained only when evidence
establishes that there is at least a reasonable possibility, given all of
the relevant considerations, that the threatened disclosure will in fact
result in the predicted injury.283 Such a linkage may seem obvious,
but current case law permits sustaining the privilege without any
finding regarding the probability that the alleged injury will in fact
result from the threatened disclosure. 284

278.

See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (explaining that information

should be protected when "there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged.").
279. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2007); MORTON H.
HALPERIN & DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, Top SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT
TO KNow 34 (1977).
280. Many reports have criticized the practice of over-classification by the federal
government. See WILLS, supra note 2; DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998); HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 279. The result of
this practice is that many documents are classified as confidential, secret, or topsecret, even though they contain no information that bears on national security.
Moreover, the classification system has been criticized because of the enormous delay
in declassifying documents that perhaps should never have been classified in the first
place. Consequently, tying the state secrets privilege to the classification system
would lead to a wholesale application of the privilege, which would not be justified.
281. The prime example of using the state secrets privilege to keep confidential documents
that would otherwise embarrass the Executive is Reynolds. See generally Rudenstine,
supra note 3, at 1285 (examining the implications of the Reynolds decision).
282. See WILLS, supra note 2, at 139.
283. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
bane).
284. Id.; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 307.
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Third, the privilege should be sustained only when evidence
establishes that the disclosure of the information will cause the
predicted injury within the foreseeable future as opposed to some
undetermined, remote, and indefinite time in the distant future. 285
Presently, there is no such requirement. 286
B. Reviewing Disputed Documents

In cases in which documents are alleged to contain state secrets,
courts should review the actual documents in dispute-as opposed to
an affidavit summarizing them-to guard against what Chief Justice
Vinson termed executive "caprice"-a caprice dramatically
illustrated in the Reynolds case itsel[.Z87 Such a change in procedure
requires discarding the rule set forth in the Reynolds case288 because
under that rule, as a practical matter, a judge will rarely if ever review
a disputed document to assess the legitimacy of the Executive
Branch's claim that it falls within the privilege?89
Many unpersuasive arguments are offered in support of the idea
that judges should review only a summary of the documents in
dispute, as opposed to the documents themselves. 29o First, it is feared
that a judge, or someone in the judge's chambers or the courthouse,
will intentionally or inadvertently disclose a sensitive document. 291
While such a security breach is conceivable, diligent research has
disclosed no instance of such an improper disclosure. 292 Second,
285.
286.
287.
288.

289.

290.
291.
292.

See United States v. Reynolds 345 U.S. I, 10 (1953).
See supra Part I; supra notes 58-80 and accompanying text.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
That rule provides that a court should sustain the executive branch's claim of privilege
without forcing the actual disclosure of the disputed information to a judge when that
judge is able to conclude from the overall circumstances of the case that there is a
reasonable danger that the disputed information contains a state secret that would, if
publicly disclosed, injure the nation's security. Id.
Id. ("[T]he court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is me'ant to
protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in
chambers.").
See id. at 8 ("Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force
disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect .... ").
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See Examining the State Secret's Privilege: Protecting National Security While
Preserving Accountability: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, IIOth Congo
5 (2008) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (quoting statement submitted by
William Webster) ("[A]s a former Federal judge, I can confirm that judges can, and
should, be trusted with sensitive information. They are fully competent to perform an
independent review of executive branch assertions of the state secrets privilege."). In
contrast, improper disclosures by members of the executive branch are frequent.
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there was once a concern that courthouses lacked the facilities to
retain top-secret documents.293 But that consideration seems no
longer valid since federal judges routinely review sensItIve
documents in criminal cases294 and in Freedom of Information Act
cases.295 Third, it is claimed that in camera, ex parte disclosure of
disputed documents to a judge will prompt the opposing party to
insist on also having access to the documents. 296 Putting aside for a
moment whether opposing counsel should have access to a disputed
document, the argument is unconvincing because a judge may simply
deny the request for access and there is no reason to think that merely
raising a claim of access will compel it. 297 Indeed, it is clear that in
some situations, judges now have access to some information not
shared with all parties.298

C. Opposing Counsel
As just noted, when the Executive currently submits documents to
a judge in support of its claim for a state secrets privilege, opposing

293.

294.
295.

296.

297.
298.

David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones
Unlawful Disclosures ofInformation, 127 HARV. L. REv. 512, 530 (2013).
A dramatic example of the lack of security in a courthouse occurred during the
frenetic litigation between the United States and the New York Times over the
newspaper's publication of what became popularly known as the Pentagon Papers.
See DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE
PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 112 (1996).
See, e.g., Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2012).
See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Operational
Files of the National Security Agency, 50 U.S.C.A. § 3 I 44(f)(I) (2012) ("[W]henever
any person who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5 alleges that
the National Security Agency has withheld records improperly because of failure to
comply with any provision of this section, judicial review shall be available under the
terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5."); see generally Christina E. Wells,
"National Security" Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1195, 1205-08 (2004) (discussing FOIA's de novo judicial review provision in
regard to claims of (b)(I) exemption).
The House of Lords cited a similar contention in its World War II Duncan opinion in
support of its conclusion that a British judge should not review disputed documents in
camera and ex parte. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) at
640-41 (appeal taken from Eng.). This argument obscures the reality that the
probable alternative to judges exercising ex parte review is judges exercising no
review at all of the disputed information. Such a stance would grant to the Executive
sole authority for deciding what information is or is not privileged, and such an
outcome would put the opposing party at a considerable disadvantage by comparison
to a procedure that included ex parte judicial review of the disputed material.
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, 8 & n.21 (1953) (emphasizing that the
judge controls the trial, rather than the executive).
See supra notes 294-295.

2014

The Courts and National Security

85

counsel is denied access to them?99 As a result, only a judge and the
Executive's representatives are present at in camera proceedings.30o
This procedure should be changed. The available evidence suggests
that judges are extremely deferential to the Executive's judgment on
national security matters. 301 When that inclination is combined with a
procedure in which the Executive's judgment is unchallenged by an
adversarial process, judges generally defer to the Executive's
j udgment. 302 The presence of opposing counsel who has secured the
appropriate security clearances would assist judges in assessing the
merits of the Executive's claims. The procedures used in other
settings in which opposing counsel has access to sensitive
information to assure against improper disclosure can be utilized here
to safeguard confidentiality and security.303
D. In Camera Hearing

Under current law, when a trial judge is unable to determine from
all the circumstances of the case that a reasonable danger exists that
disclosure of the information in dispute would injure national
security, that judge has the authority to conduct an ex parte
evidentiary hearing in which a government officer testifies as to why
a judge should sustain the asserted claim of privilege. 304 Nonetheless,
research has identified not one case in which a judge has exercised
that authority.305 If judges are to retain meaningful control of the
evidence in a case, they must, in appropriate circumstances, be
willing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application of the
privilege to the information in dispute. 306

299. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
300. Id.
301. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) ("The
Court also provided guidance on how claims of privilege should be analyzed and held
that, under the circumstances, the district court should have sustained the privilege
without even requiring the government to produce the report for in camera review."
(citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953))).
302. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1395-97.
303. The State Secrets Protection Act of 2009, S. 417, lllth Congo (1st. Sess. 2009) was
introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy and would have permitted opposing counsel
access to the disputed documents.
304. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
305. See generally Donahue, supra note 22.
306. Even the remarkably deferential position adopted by Chief Justice Vinson in the
Reynolds decision left open the possibility of such a hearing. See supra Part I.
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E. A Qualified Privilege

The contemporary state secrets privilege is an absolute privilege. 307
Accordingly, once a judge decides from the overall context that there
is a reasonable probability that the disputed information or document
would endanger the national security if disclosed, the judge must
sustain the privilege no matter how insignificant or remote the danger
or how important the information may be to a party claiming
injury.308 Thus, the contemporary state secrets privilege permits no
balancing or weighing of the importance of the information to
national security against the vindication of an individual's legal
claims, or even to the public's interest in knowing of the Executive's
conduct.
The absolute character of the privilege is supported by two claims.
First, the judiciary has made a policy decision that any threatened
injury to national security warrants sustaining the privilege, no matter
how important the disputed information may be to a party alleging
serious injury.309 There is no doubt that national security must be
protected. But the absolute character of the privilege-combined
with the executive's de facto authority to decide what information is
or is not covered by the privilege-permits the protection of
information that may present only an insignificant and improbable
threat to the nation's security. Second, the absolute character of the
privilege seems to rest on a distrust of the judiciary'S competence to
resolve questions implicating national security without seriously
harming it. 3IO
However, the privilege can be qualified without harming national
security. A party seeking access to the disputed documents or
information could be required to establish that such documents or
information contain evidence central to establishing liability, that the
evidence could not be obtained in any other way,311 and that the party
seeks the vindication of important rights. For its part, the Executive
would have an opportunity to establish the significance of the alleged
national security injury, and the likelihood that the injury would in
fact follow from the disclosure and would occur within some
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

See supra Parts I-II.
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, \0 (1953).
See supra notes 134-148 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
The Court in Reynolds sought to justify its judgment on the assumption that the
plaintiffs had "an available alternative, which might have given [them] the evidence to
make out their case without forcing a showdown on the claim of privilege." 345 U.S.
at 11. But this assumption seems extremely doubtful. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at
1375-78.
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foreseeable time frame as opposed to some undefined moment in the
future. In weighing these competing factors, a court would uphold
the privilege, regardless of its significance to the injured party, if the
government established with concrete evidence that the threatened
injury was significant, that it would likely follow upon disclosure,
and that it would occur within some reasonable time frame following
disclosure. Such an approach would qualify the privilege while still
protecting legitimate national security considerations.
F. Restraining the Dismissal Remedy

The "unacceptable risk" analysis requires a case to be dismissed
before discovery is commenced or a responsive pleading is filed.312
As already noted, that remedial approach requires judges to engage in
predictive decision-making long before issues are sharply defined and
the relevant evidence is inventoried.313 This is an excessively harsh
outcome for a party alleging serious injury. In privilege cases, courts
should not abandon their traditional and strong preference for
deciding issues in a concrete and specific factual context, which, in
privilege cases, would mean that courts should delay considering the
dismissal of an action until the parties have concretely defined the
issues in dispute and identified with some specificity the evidence
arguably covered by the privilege. 314
G. Party Parity

The extension of the privilege from information sought by the
plaintiff to information sought by the defendant was consistent with
Reynolds. 315 But the burdens of the extension fell entirely on the

312. See supra Part I1.C.I.
313. See supra Part I1.C.1.
314. Amanda Frost has a novel but impractical suggestion for restraining the dismissal of
actions: "The judge could issue a stay and inform the parties that she will continue to
abstain only if she is convinced that Congress will take back the oversight role that it
delegated to the courts when it granted jurisdiction over cases challenging the legality
of executive action." Frost, supra note 22, at 1963.
315. "[B]ut in substance it is agreed that the court must be satisfied from all the evidence
and circumstances, and 'from the implications of the question, in the setting in which
it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot
be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.'"
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87
(1951)).
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plaintife 16 Surely a defendant deserves a fair day in court; but then,
so does a plaintiff. While it would be a "mockery,,317 of justice to
impose a judgment on a defendant in a case in which plaintiff s
essential allegations were false, it is also a mockery of justice to
dismiss a plaintiffs' complaint merely because a defendant may be
hampered in establishing a valid defense. 318 There are powerful
reasons for avoiding both mockeries, but for now courts are only
focused on protecting defendants from an injustice. 319
Judges should balance out the burdens of the privilege in two ways.
They could reduce the hardship on the plaintiff by reforming the
privilege so that it functioned in accord with the considerations set
forth in this section. In privileged cases involving information
helpful to a defendant, they could limit the dismissal remedy to cases
in which it was evident that the allegations essential to plaintiffs'
claims were false. In other cases, the presumption would be that the
privileged information potentially helpful to a defendant is treated as
if a witness had died, which would impose the burden on a defendant
to offer a defense based on other available information. That
presumption could be overcome, but only in unusual cases, and only
if a judge set forth convincing reasons for imposing the burdens
triggered by the privilege solely on the plaintiff.
IV. CONSEQUENCES AND POSSIBILITIES OF
RESTRUCTURING
Given that the arguments favoring the restructuring of the state
secrets privilege are powerful,320 and given that the privilege is
already in disfavor,321 why is it that a dominant body of judges today
will not restructure the state secrets privilege or modify their posture
on deference? The explanation of this dynamic must be the character
of the juristic mind that endorses the idea that courts should exhibit
the "utmost deference,,322 in all matters affecting national security,
including the state secrets privilege.
Attempting to penetrate a juristic mind that has shaped an era of
deference is hazardous. Such an inquiry will not portray the thinking
316.

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affinning summary
judgment against plaintiff when privileged infonnation provided a complete defense
to plaintiffs claim).
Id. at 825.
See Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1991).
See id. at 547.
See supra Part III.
See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974).
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of all judges favoring the current degree of deference, and it will not
describe the thinking of judges who have criticized the contemporary
state secrets privilege or the general perspective of deference.
Nonetheless, attempting to penetrate the judicial mind that has
generated the state secrets privilege as part of the broader Age of
Deference is essential if the development is to be understood and the
possibilities of change are to be appreciated. To be sure, any legal
mindset is composed of entangled variables-precedent, values,
pragmatic considerations, prejudices, aspirations, expectations-that
may bleed into one another, reinforce one another, and vary over time
and with context. 323 Thus, in seeking to disentangle the variables that
comprise the juristic mind set of deference, some distortion may be
committed on the integrity of the whole. 324
Nonetheless,
disentanglement is required if there IS any possibility of
understanding the whole.
The deferential juristic mindset has three pivotal poles. The first
concerns judicial competence. From this perspective, judges are not
competent to decide matters implicating national security because, as
Justice Jackson wrote, these matters are "political, not judicial," in
nature, they are "delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy," and they are decisions for which the "[j]udiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been
held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial
intrusion or inquiry.,,325 From this vantage point, no matter how

323. See Yao Wu & Olga Yevtukhova, Influences on Judicial Decision-Making in Federal
and Bankruptcy Courts, SOCIAL LAW LIBRARY, available at http://socialaw.comldocs/
default-source/slbookljudgeyoung09/16wu-yevtukhova-paper.pdf?sfvrsn=2
(last
visited Nov. 17,2014).
324. See Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision
Making, 98 IOWA L. REv. 465, 468-69 (2013).
325. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). The
views that Justice Jackson expressed in his opinion for the Court in Chicago & South
Air Lines, Inc. were in accord with those in his dissent in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 244-46 (1945). But see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953),
rev'g 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), in which Jackson dissented for the reasons
expressed by the Third Circuit, 192 F.2d at 997-that is, he supported an in camera,
ex parte review by an Article III judge of the information that the Executive asserted
must be protected by the state secrets privilege. Most recently, Eric A. Posner's
review of Rahul Sager's Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy (2013) is
just one indication that the competency claim continues to be vital and current in the
discussion of the court's role in national security cases. Eric A. Posner, Before You
Reboot the NSA, Think About This: The Paradox of Secrecy, THE NEW REpUBLIC
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.comlarticleI1152911rahul-sagars-secret-
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much evidence is presented, how many experts testify, or how many
days a hearing may last, judges will lack a broad perspective
seasoned by years of experience, and, as a result, judges will, through
no fault of trying or effort or intelligence, simply not be competent,
as Jackson wrote, to "review and perhaps nullify" a decision made by
members of the executive branch. 326
No one quarrels with the claim that the Constitution allocates to the
Executive and Congress primary responsibility for the nation's
security. But primary responsibility is not exclusive responsibility
and the competency claim is so open-ended it could apply just as
easily to other cases that the court has in fact decided that affect
important, substantive aspects of American life-such as the
economy,327 health care,328 and scientific stud~29-similarly
obscuring them from judicial review. Moreover, the claim that
competency--or, to be more precise, incompetency-should disable
judges in national security cases is not descriptive ofhistory.33o Thus,
in some landmark national security cases, federal judges have

326.

327.
328.
329.

330.

leaks-reviewed-eric-posner ("Judges have pled time and again that they lack the
training and knowledge to second-guess soldiers and spies.").
Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc., 333 U.S. at III; see generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 582-84 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he courts simply lack the relevant
expertise to second-guess determinations made by the President based on information
properly withheld."); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 757-58 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he judiciary may not properly go beyond these two
inquiries and redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national
security."); Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 708-10 (1952) (Vinson, c.J., dissenting) ("A
sturdy judiciary should not be swayed by the unpleasantness or unpopularity of
necessary executive action, but must independently determine for itself whether the
President was acting, as required by the Constitution, to 'take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed. "').
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,36-38 (1937).
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579-80 (2012) (discussing
the constitutionalitY of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013)
(discussing the validity of patents for isolated DNA sequences associated with
predisposition to certain cancers and for diagnostic methods of identifying mutations
in those DNA sequences).
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769 (2008) ("The Government presents no
credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if
habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees' claims."); United States v.
United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. Of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972)
("We cannot accept the Government's argument that internal security matters are too
subtle and complex for judicial evaluation."). Even the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Reynolds did not close the door on a federal judge reviewing
classified and highly sensitive documents. 345 U.S. 1,6-10 (1953).
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exercised meaningful review, and by so doing have contributed to the
prestige and legitimacy of the courts. 331
Consider the Steel Seizure Case 332 of 1952. Faced with the
possibility of a union strike that would shut the nation's steel mills,
President Truman directed his Secretary of Commerce to take
possession of and operate most of the mills on the basis that a strike
would "jeopardize . . . national defense," in that steel was an
indispensable component of "substantially all weapons and other war
materials" required in the ongoing Korean War.333 After the Supreme
Court ruled that President Truman's seizure was unconstitutional, "a
53-day steel strike ensued ... and no steel shortage occurred."334
Though the legal issue presented did not require the Court to decide
the direct question-namely, whether a strike would or would not
result in a shortage of steel and have immediate consequences for the
United States service units in Korea335-it seems naIve to imagine
that the six members of the majority did not assess that factor as part
of the process of deciding the case.
Consider also the celebrated Pentagon Papers case in which the
Nixon Administration claimed that the continued publication by the
New York Times and the Washington Post of excerpts from a "Top
Secret-Sensitive" Pentagon-sponsored history of the United States
involvement in Vietnam from World War II to 1968 would seriously
harm national security.336 After reviewing the evidence, the Supreme
Court concluded that the administration had not satisfied its "heavy"
evidentiary burden and refused to grant a prior restraint. 337 Years
later, Erwin Griswold, the Solicitor General who argued the
government's appeal in the case, stated that the newspapers'
publication of the Pentagon Papers excerpts caused no harm to the
nation's security.338
331.
332.
333.
334.

335.
336.
337.
338.

See supra, text accompanying notes 245-248.
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Id. at 582-83, 590.
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 306 (18th ed.
2013).
See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 582-84.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-18 (1971).
Id.
See RUDENSTlNE, supra note 293 for a thorough history of the Pentagon Papers case.
For recent national security cases in which the Court asserted its independence and
ruled against the Executive, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); and Rasul
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). See David Rudenstine, American Preeminence,
Separation of Power and Human Rights: The Guantanamo Detainee Case, in
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Second, it is claimed that courts should defer in national security
cases because the issues are of such importance that courts must
stand aside and let the Executive and Legislative Branches, which are
politically accountable, govern without judicial oversight. 339 Similar
to the claim of competence, this claim is undermined by its sweeping
character. Courts routinely decide many matters of high significance
to the nation-such as same-sex marriage, abortion, affirmative
action, the right to die, health care, voting rights and campaign
financing;340 it is hardly obvious that courts should be disabled by the
political accountability argument only in national security matters.
Moreover, because national security matters vary greatly in
importance, it is unconvincing to claim that courts should defer to the
Executive in all national security matters merely because they
possibly should in rare cases.
Furthermore, the political unaccountability charge against courts is
simplistic to a fault. Courts are hardly immune from political and
popular influences. 341 Congress has substantial control over the
jurisdiction of the COurtS/42 the Executive influences the direction of
the courts through the appointment of judges,343 and there is
substantial evidence indicating that over time public opinion has a
shaping influence on judicial outcomes. 344 The implication that

339.
340.

341.
342.
343.

344.

GUANTANAMO BAY AND THE JUDICIAL-MORAL TREATMENT OF THE OTHER 15 (Clark
Butler ed., 2007) (highlighting the break with the tradition of deference that the
Hamdi and Rasul cases represented) [hereinafter American Preeminence, Separation
ofPower and Human Rights].
See American Preeminence, Separation of Power and Human Rights, supra note 338,
at 23.
At least one jurist, however, advocates deference even in these cases. See David
Rudenstine, Self-Government and the Judicial Function, 92 TEX. L. REv. 161, 161-62
(2013) (reviewing J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (Oxford
University Press 2012)).
Id. at 195 & nn.290-91.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 573-75 (2006); Ex Parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506,512-14 (1868).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Charles M. Blow of the New York Times recently
highlighted the composition of the United States Supreme Court by the political party
of the President who nominated each member of the Court. Among his interesting
findings, his statistics indicated that from 1976 to 2008 the Court membership
consisted at anyone time of no less than seven members appointed by a Republican
president. In his column, Blow wrote that appointment of federal judges "is where a
president can exert power long after he has officially faded from power." Charles M.
Blow, Court Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1,2013), http://www.nytimes.comJ2013/11102/
opinionlblow-court-fight.html.
See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION

2014

The Courts and National Security

93

courts are politically insulated suggests that the Executive and the
administrative agencies and departments that comprise the national
security state are at the opposite end of the accountability spectrum
and are highly politically accountable. But that is surely not so. A
second-term president holds office on the legitimacy of the past
presidential election but is no longer politically accountable. 345 More
strikingly, the numerous departments and agencies directly
responsible for national security function mainly in secret. 346 Thus,
the National Security Council, CIA, National Security Agency, and
intelligence agencies within the Pentagon function in secref47 and
have only limited accountability to Congress-and then, only to a
few members on select committees-and almost no accountability to
the public. 348 Once the political accountability claim is placed in this

345.
346.

347.

348.

(2009) (chronicling the history of the link between public opinion and judicial
review).
U.S. CaNST. amend. XXII.
See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (ruling that an individual
who sought disclosure of the CIA budget under the "Statement and Account" Clause
of the Constitution was not entitled to information that precisely detailed CIA
expenditures).
Although the Constitution states that, "a regular statement and account of the receipts
and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time," U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7, the CIA's budget is secret. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 16869, 175. Thus, the voting public learns about CIA expenditures only when the
Executive makes such expenditures public or when a government official makes an
unauthorized disclosure, as was very recently done regarding the "bags" of cash the
CIA leaves in the office of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. See Matthew Rosenberg,
With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29,
2013), http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/04/29/woridlasialcia-delivers-cash-to-afghanleaders-office.html; see also Chesney, supra note 22, at 1430-31 (referencing the
undemocratic nature of the "the decisionmaking role of the Administrative Review
Board (ARB) mechanism for Gmintanamo detainees .... [T]he nature of the ARB's
composition ... and the non-transparent nature of its work . . . call into question
whether there is a meaningful nexus between ARB decisions and democratic
accountability. ").
Unauthorized disclosures by government employees-so-called "Ieaks"-are a staple
of national security reporting. Indeed, some even maintain that because of the
enormous net cast by the United States classification system there would be no
meaningful national security reporting absent unauthorized disclosures. Max Frankel,
Where Did Our 'Inalienable Rights' Go?, N.Y. TiMES (June 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.coml2013/06/23/opinionlsunday/where-did-our-inalienablerights-go.html; Andrew Beaujon, Jill Abramson: Leak Prosecutions Threaten to 'Rob
the Public of Vital Information,' POYNTER (June 18, 2012, 8:57 AM),
http://www.poynter.orgllatest-news/mediawire/I77554/jill-abramson-Ieakprosecutions-threaten-to-rob-the-public-of-vital-informationl; Arthur S. Brisbane,
National Secrets and National Security, N.Y. TiMES (June 16, 2012),
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light, the merits of the claim can be turned on their head for it is
highly plausible that the public nature of judicial proceedings would
make national security policies and operations more transparent.
The third cluster of considerations asserted in support of judicial
deference revolves around the idea that the protection of national
security trumps all other interests. 349 Underlying this perspective is a
conception of national security that emphasizes current, narrowly
construed security interests over a broader conception of security
with long-term implications.
Several considerations undermine this perspective. First, there is
simply no evidence that an alteration of the deferential judicial stance
in cases implicating national security will increase the risk of national
danger. Indeed, as noted, in cases in which federal judges have
exercised meaningful judicial review, they have impressively
acquitted themselves. 35o Second, there is reason to believe that
curbing judicial deference may enhance the nation's security because
the expectation of more meaningful judicial oversight might cause
the Executive to proceed with deliberateness, which may result in
http://www.nytimes.coml20 12/06/1 71opinionlsunday/national-secrets-and-nationalsecurity.htm\. For an historic statement of the importance of unauthorized disclosures
in informing the American public about national security matters, see the affidavit of
Max Frankel, dated June 17, 1971, filed in the Pentagon Papers case, in which he
stated:
Without the use of "secrets" that I shall attempt to explain in this
affidavit, there could be no adequate diplomatic, military and
political reporting of the kind our people take for granted, either
abroad or in Washington and there could be no mature system of
communication between the Government and the people.
Affidavit of Max Frankel at ~ 4, United States v. N.Y. Times, 328 F. Supp. 324
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (No. 71 Civ. 2662), 1971 WL 224067. In that regard, the Obama
Administration has initiated "an aggressive focus on leaks and leakers that has led to
more than twice as many prosecutions as there were in all previous administrations
combined." Sharon LaFraniere, Math Behind Leak Crackdown: 153 Cases, 4 Years, 0
Indictments, N.Y. TiMES (July 20,2013), http://www.nytimes.coml2013/07/211us/
politics/math-behind-Ieak-crackdown-IS 3-cases-4-years-0-indictments.html.
349. See, e.g., Marcus Eyth, The CIA and Covert Operations: To Disclose or Not to
Disclose-That is the Question, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 45, 71 (2002). Chief Justice
Rehnquist raised this consideration in Tenet v. Doe:
The state secrets privilege and the more frequent use of in camera
judicial proceedings simply cannot provide the absolute protection
we found necessary in enunciating the Totten rule. The possibility
that a suit may proceed and an espionage relationship may be
revealed, if the state secrets privilege is found not to apply, is
unacceptable.
544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005).
350. See supra notes 15, 325-38 and accompanying text.
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wiser decisions in the long term. 351 Third, the Executive demand for
judicial deference rests in part on the assumption that security
depends solely on the military front lines- front lines that are
defined by elusive non-state actors. 352 This outlook overlooks the
importance of what is often termed "soft-power," which emphasizes
factors that greatly contribute to America's standing in the world,
such as the freedom of American private and public institutions, the
scope of individual liberties, and the rule of law. 353
CONCLUSION
In retrospect, the Executive's claims for an expansive construction
of the state secrets privilege may be dispiriting, but it is not
surprising. Indeed, given the constitutional structure of the national
government and what might be thought of as the constitutional
invitation for the three branches to compete for authority and power,
it should be expected that the President, who is Commander-in-Chief
and dominates in national security matters, will continually assert
authority and press the other two co-equal branches to cede to its
requests and demands for more and more unilateral authority.
At the same time, it is disappointing that the Supreme Court has
failed to wend its way through the thicket so as to simultaneously
respect Executive and Congressional responsibilities to protect the
national security, and to not surrender so completely its own
independence and its responsibility to provide a meaningful check on
Executive power. But that is what the Supreme Court has done. For
decades, it has endorsed a robust and sweeping state secrets privilege
and even recently-without one member of the Court breaking ranks
and criticizing the Court's disposition-reaffirmed its long-standing
refusal to reconsider the scope of the privilege. 354
The fact that the high court's attitude toward the privilege seems so
impenetrable to change, especially given that the privilege is so
351. See SHANE, supra note 15.
352. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952).
353. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS 6 (2004). President Barack Obama recently acknowledged this basic political
tenet in a speech at the National Defense University: "So America is at a crossroads.
We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. We
have to be mindful of James Madison's warning that 'No nation could preserve its
freedom in the midst of continual warfare. '" President Barack Obama, Remarks by
the President at the National Defense University, WHITEHouSE.GOV (May 23, 2013),
http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 13/05123/remarks-president-nationaldefense-university.
354. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1906-07 (20 II).
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convincingly criticized, is best understood as a manifestation of the
Age of Deference. 355 For decades, the Supreme Court has adopted a
hands-off attitude toward the Executive in national security cases,356
and while there are notable exceptions to this pattern, those
exceptions remain just that--exceptions. 357 The general rule is one of
deference, and while the past suggests that now and then a majority
of justices will break ranks with tradition, all signals indicate that no
one currently on the Court will challenge the general rule of
deference in the near future. As a result, there is little reason to
expect that the Court will any time soon revise the privilege, and
moreover, even if the Court did revise the privilege, absent a
substantial shift in the Court's deferential disposition, the balloon
effect created by the cluster of doctrines that comprise the Age of
Deference would sharply minimize the importance of the
restructuring.
This is a deeply regrettable state of affairs. And although no one
claims that the expanded privilege will "plunge us straightway," as
Justice Jackson wrote in another context, "into dictatorship ... it is at
least a step in that wrong direction.,,358 And because, as Jackson also
wrote, "men have discovered no technique for long preserving free
government except that the Executive be under the law," although it
may well be that free government "may be destined to pass away . . .
it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give [it] Up.,,359
Perhaps in time individual justices on the Supreme Court will
reconsider the Court's deferential disposition in national security
cases, and write opinions that chart a new course-a course in which
the Court functions as a third co-equal and independent branch of
government that provides meaningful judicial review of Executive
policies and conduct, even in cases implicating national security.

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1287.
See supra notes 6 & 13.
See supra note 15.
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id at 655.
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APPENDICES
Methodology

The three appendices illustrate the rate at which citations to United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) have appeared in federal court
decisions and law review articles over time (the "intensity" of
citations to Reynolds). A decision or article is only counted once,
regardless of how many times it mentions Reynolds; no distinction is
made between decisions and articles that merely mention Reynolds,
and those that explore it in great detail. Data for the graphs was
collected using the KeyCite function on WestlawNext, an "up-to-theminute citation service" which enables users to retrieve citing
references and is available via a toolbar above every document
accessed on WestlawNext, including Reynolds. 360 More specifically,
the KeyCite feature for "Viewing Citing References for a Case"
(called "Citing References" on the KeyCite toolbar) was used to
generate lists of decisions and articles. Each list was then exported to
Microsoft Excel, sorted by date of decision/publication, and tallied to
provide the data for the tables in the appendices.
The lists that provided the data for Appendices 1 and 3 were
generated by narrowing the Citing References to display only court
decisions (called "Cases" in the section of the sidebar labeled
"View"). The Citing References were narrowed further to display
only decisions from federal District Courts (Table 1, Appendix 1),
Courts of Appeae 61 (Table 2, Appendix 1), and the Supreme Court
(Table 1, Appendix 3). This further narrowing was accomplished by
selecting the appropriate checkbox in the sidebar labeled
"Jurisdiction."
The list that provided the data for Appendix 2 was generated by
narrowing the Citing References to display only "Secondary Sources"
(in the section of the sidebar labeled "View"), which were then
narrowed further to display only "Law Reviews" (also in the "View"
section).
Court decisions and law review articles that were
decided/published after 2013, are not reflected in the appendices.

360. KeyCite
on
Westlaw
Next,
THOMPSON
REUTERS
(2012),
https:llinfo.legalsolutions.thomsomeuters.comlpdf/wln21L-356347.pdf.
361. In addition to the Circuit Courts, this includes one decision by the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals.
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Appendix 1
Table 1
Intensity of District Court Citations to Reynolds from 1953 to 2013

Table 2
Intensity of Circuit Court Citations to Reynolds from 1953 to 2013
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Appendix 2
Table 3
Intensity of Law Review Citations to Reynolds from 1953 to 2013
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Appendix 3

Table 4

Legend
2010-present
Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011).

2000-2009
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
1990-2000
no cases

1980-1989
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1 (1988).
Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw.lPeace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139
(1981).
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1970-1979
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Envt!. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

1960-1969
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).

1950-1959
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).

Notes to Appendix 3
The Court has only considered the state secrets privilege and Reynolds on
rare occasions. In these instances, the Court has never explicitly expanded
Reynolds beyond its original scope. While the Court does apply Reynolds
to new circumstances, the pure holding of the case does not seem to be
disturbed. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900
(2011), is the only case in which the Court seems to be mildly cautioning
courts on the use of the privilege, declaring that the "privilege 'is not to be
lightly invoked, ", and that "[ c]ourts should be even more hesitant to
declare a Government contract unenforceable because of state secrets. It
is the option of last resort, available in a very narrow set of
circumstances." Id. at 1910 (citation omitted). In General Dynamics,
Justice Scalia held that when the state secrets privilege is invoked to
dismiss a government contractor's prima facie valid "superior knowledge"
affirmative defense to the government's allegations of contractual breach,
the proper remedy is to leave the parties where they were on the day that
they filed suit. /d. at 1902. Justice Scalia noted that the proper state
secrets jurisprudence does not arise from Reynolds but from Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) and Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
/d. at 1906. This is because Reynolds deals with "a Government privilege
against court-ordered disclosure of state and military secrets," while
Totten and Tenet deal with "alleged contracts to spy." Id. at 1905-06.
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974), the Court briefly but
meaningfully discussed the states secrets privilege holding that it was "in
the public interest to afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest
protection consistent with the fair administration of justice." Further, in
regard to Presidential privilege, in Nixon v. Adm 'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425 (1977), Justice Brennan discusses presidential privilege and
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confidentiality for a fonner president. Relying on Reynolds, the Court
contended that, "only an incumbent President can assert the privilege of
the Presidency." Id. at 448. The privilege belongs to the Government and
must be asserted by it, it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private
party. Id. A fonner president is less in need of the privilege than an
incumbent, and also there are "obvious political checks against an
incumbent's abuse of the privilege." Id.
Even when a case meaningfully discussed Reynolds, state secrets was not
always the topic per se. For instance, in Kerr v. u.s. Dist. Court for N.
Dist. of Cal. , 426 U.S. 394 (1976), Justice Marshall was primarily
concerned with whether documents from a prison could be disclosed when
prisoners filed a class action against the California Department of
Correction. The Court affinned the Court of Appeals decision, which
discussed Reynolds and proposed that "in camera review is a highly
appropriate and useful means of dealing with claims of governmental
privilege." Id. at 406.
The Court in United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989), in an opinion by
Justice Blackmun, also relied on Reynolds for its elucidation of in camera
review. Quoting Reynolds, Blackmun recognized that '''examination of
the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers' might in some cases
'jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect. '" Id. at
570 (citation omitted). The Zolin Court agreed with the assertion in
Reynolds that "some compromise" between too much judicial inquiry and
a complete abandonment of judicial control "must be reached." Id. at 571.
The Court then attempted to fashion a standard for when in camera review
would be appropriate, and relied on Caldwell v. Dist. Court, 644 P.2d 26,
33 (Colo. 1982) for its result.
In Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005), the Court primarily grapples with the
Totten rule, but points out that Reynolds "cannot plausibly be read to have
replaced the categorical Totten bar with the balancing of the state secrets
evidentiary privilege in the distinct class of cases that depend upon
clandestine spy relationships." !d. at 9-10.
Most of the court cases that cite to Reyonds are brief and perfunctory. In
some of the cases, there is only one citation to Reynolds and no expansive
discussion on the case. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S.
367,389 (2004); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988); U.S. Dep't of
Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 13 (1988). In Weinberger v. Catholic Action
ofHawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139, 147 (1981), the Court
claims to be "confront[ing] a similar situation" to Reynolds, however, it
only cites to Reynolds once. In Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73 (1973), the Court only weakly relies on Reynolds and
proposes that:
in the absence of a claim that disclosure would jeopardize state
secrets, memoranda consisting only of compiled factual material or
purely factual material contained in deliberative memoranda and
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severable from its context would generally be available for discovery
by private parties in litigation with the Government.
Id. at 87-88 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
In one instance, Reynolds is included within a string of citations. See
Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,527 (1988). In two instances,
Reynolds is cited to as a "cf." or "compare to" citation. See Boumediene
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 757 (1971). Other times, Reynolds is only mentioned in a
footnote. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 n.35 (1982); Gelbard
v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 44 n.3 (1972); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 738 n.25 (1972); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,645
n.ll (1972). The Court has also cited to Reynolds in dicta. See Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 199 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating he would "go even further" than the Court
in Reynolds and "lay upon trial judges the affirmative duty of assuring
themselves that the national security interests claimed to justify an in
camera proceeding are real and not merely colorable"). In a defamation
case, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 196 (1979), the Court cites to
Reynolds, stating that a "general statement of need will not prevail over a
concrete demonstration of the necessity for executive secrecy."
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